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I present three different studies in three chapters. In chapter 1, I describe a general
theoretical framework for the evolution of cooperation both within and between
species. Three general models are distinguished by which cooperation can evolve
and be maintained: (i) directed reciprocation—cooperation with individuals who
give in return; (ii) shared genes—cooperation with relatives; and (iii) byproduct
benefits—cooperation as an incidental consequence of selfish action.
In chapter 2, I investigate the origins of cooperation at the genotypic and
phenotypic levels. While theory and empirical work enlighten the maintenance of
cooperation, few studies explore its origins. Here, I examine the origins of
cooperation by experimentally evolving two antagonistic bacteriophages. I
experimentally enforced the two bacteriophages, f1 and IKe, to undergo fifty
iterated cycles of co-infection, paired vertical transmission, and infectious
transmission in Escherichia coli cells. Phenotypic and genomic analysis then
characterized the outcome. Strikingly, the two bacteriophages evolved to co-
viii
package their genomes into one symbiotic unit, ensuring co-transmission during the
infectious stage. Furthermore, one bacteriophage evolved a minimal genome with
the inability to infect cells independently, becoming an obligate viral symbiont.
These results parallel a wide variety of natural systems: evolution of reduced
genomes, co-transmission of partners, and obligate coexistence between
cooperating species.
In chapter 3, I examine a puzzling example of cooperation between species, the
symbiotic interaction that occurs in corals, hydras, and jellyfish and their
dinoflagellate algae. These algae are mostly acquired infectiously, and according to
models of virulence evolution should be selected to exploit the host. However,
symbiont cheating is virtually unknown. I experimentally manipulated transmission
mode of algal symbionts in jellyfish hosts to determine if altering symbiont
transmission mode selects for cheating within symbiont populations. Cheating
symbionts evolved under experimentally enforced horizontal transmission. Fitness
estimates revealed that cheater algae had faster within-host growth, higher dispersal
rates, and caused lower host growth compared to algae which underwent repeated
vertical transmission. A trade-off was detected between harm caused to hosts and
symbiont fitness. Such trade-offs have been modeled for pathogen evolution and
may be critical in stabilizing ‘infectious’ symbioses.
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CHAPTER I:
The evolution of cooperation
CHAPTER ABSTRACT
Darwin recognized that natural selection could not favor a trait in one
species solely for the benefit of another species. The modern, selfish-gene view of
the world suggests that cooperation between individuals, whether of the same
species or different species, should be especially vulnerable to the evolution of
noncooperators. Yet, cooperation is prevalent in nature both within and between
species. What special circumstances or mechanisms thus favor cooperation?
Currently, evolutionary biology offers a set of disparate explanations, and a general
framework for this breadth of models has not emerged. Here, we offer a tripartite
structure that links previously disconnected views of cooperation. We distinguish
three general models by which cooperation can evolve and be maintained: (i)
directed reciprocation— cooperation with individuals who give in return; (ii)
shared genes—cooperation with relatives (e.g., kin selection); and (iii) byproduct
benefits—cooperation as an incidental consequence of selfish action. Each general
model is further subdivided. Several renowned examples of cooperation that have
lacked explanation until recently—plant-rhizobium symbioses and bacteria-squid
light organs—fit squarely within this framework. Natural systems of cooperation
often involve more than one model, and a fruitful direction for future research is to
understand how these models interact to maintain cooperation in the long term.
INTRODUCTION
A few key studies in the 1960s led to a radical change in the way biologists
viewed the evolution of cooperative interactions. Challenging the nearly pervasive
and casual attitude of most biologists that held that interactions evolve for the good
of the species, Hamilton (1964a,b) and Williams (1966) explained how natural
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selection was intrinsically selfish, and that cooperative acts were likely to evolve
only under restrictive conditions. This shift in paradigm then set the stage for a
major focus on the evolution of cooperation in the last two decades. The evolution
of cooperation contrasts with the evolution of traits that directly and solely benefit
the individual possessing them, such as sharp teeth, visual acuity, or crypsis.
Cooperation by definition involves an interaction between individuals that benefits
the recipient but not necessarily the donor. At face value, therefore, cooperation
presents an evolutionary dilemma, one that underlies a famous quote of Darwin
(1859): “Natural selection cannot possibly produce any modification in any one
species exclusively for the good of another species” (p 228). Darwin realized that
the bearers of a trait must themselves benefit if the trait is to be favored under
natural selection. The modern version of Darwin’s criterion is that the genes
underlying a cooperative trait must themselves benefit disproportionately if they
are to increase in frequency. How then do cooperative traits overcome this
evolutionary hurdle?
Hamilton (1964a, 1964b) proposed one solution that can operate within
species: the genes for cooperation tend to benefit copies of themselves in others,
and thus are favored by a process of “kin selection” (Maynard Smith 1964). While
kin selection has provided the conceptual framework for understanding cooperation
between relatives, a vast number of cooperative traits are not explained by
Hamilton’s solution (cooperation between species, for example). Today, a
pluralistic approach has emerged, in which multiple models attempt to explain
various idiosyncratic examples of selfless behavior. The full account of models for
cooperation includes not only kin selection, but the iterated prisoner’s dilemma of
reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981), synergism (Queller
1985), indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1987; Nowak and Sigmund 1998), partner
choice (Eshel and Cavalli- Sforza 1982; Noë  1990; Bull and Rice 1991), policing
(Frank 1995, 2003), pseudoreciprocity and parceling (Connor 1995b), to name a
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few. However, this panoply of models does not offer obvious themes that underlie
our modern understanding of the evolution of cooperation.
This paper offers a hierarchical framework in which the principal models of
cooperative evolution are readily compared, and in which known examples can be
accommodated. Alternative frameworks have been proposed: inclusive fitness
theory (Queller 1985), trait group selection (Wilson 1975; Wilson and Dugatkin
1997), and repression of competition/policing (Frank 1995, 2003). We think that
the framework offered here is the most comprehensive and provides a more natural
accommodation of the diverse biological examples of cooperation. We suggest that
multiple frameworks are desirable, however, and are motivated by the belief that
enlightenment emerges out of the contrast between different conceptual
frameworks.
The structure for this paper is as follows. We define cooperation and then
proceed to explain our framework using traditional examples and models. Since
none of the models presented are original to us, it is the organization of models that
distinguishes this paper from others. Next, we apply this framework to diverse
biological systems, ranging from well-studied and well-understood examples to
cases that are complex and enigmatic. Finally, we suggest avenues of further study.
What is Cooperation?
All cooperation involves acts by one individual (X) that benefit one or more
other individuals (Y ). Beyond this deceptively simple core, there is an intricacy
that complicates attempts to unite different models under a single approach. The
greatest focus in the field has been on “costly” acts by individual X that benefit Y,
because the challenge in such cases is to understand how natural selection can
tolerate the maintenance of acts by X that potentially lower X’s fitness. More
recently, however, the field has included cases in which acts by individual X
benefit both X and Y. These cases, known as byproducts, can be understood by
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relatively straightforward selective mechanisms.
Cooperation is usually considered a two-way interaction, such as a
mutualism or symbiosis. For the sake of deconstructing the evolution of
cooperation, we adopt a one-sided perspective that considers the costs and benefits
accruing to one partner at a time. This one-sided perspective is essential for
addressing the evolution of cooperation between species, because the evolutionary
process leading to and maintaining cooperation is operating separately in each
species. The critical mechanisms stabilizing cooperation can be different in two
interacting species.
This one-sided perspective also expands the realm of examples that are
relevant to the evolution of cooperation to include exploitation and parasitism. This
generalization can be realized by considering a one-dimensional continuum of
possible actions of individual X on individual Y, with cooperation at the left end
and antagonistic/exploitative interactions at the right. Evolution in X that shifts its
location on the continuum toward the left has, by definition, evolved to be more
cooperative, regardless of where it sits on that continuum. Thus, the framework
applies beyond interactions that are strictly cooperative.
THE FRAMEWORK
Our classification divides types of cooperation into three general models: i)
directed reciprocation—cooperation with individuals that return benefits; ii)
shared genes—cooperation with relatives (e.g., kin selection); and iii) byproduct
benefits—cooperation with others as a coincident of selfish actions (Table 1). Each
general model can be further subdivided. Directed reciprocation is divided into
partner choice (benefits are returned by specifically chosen partners) and partner
fidelity feedback (benefits are returned by partners that are coupled in fitness).
Shared genes is divided into kin choice (cooperation with relatives based on
phenotypic recognition of those relatives) and kin fidelity (cooperation with
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relatives based on a social context of spatial association). Finally, byproducts is
divided into: one-way byproducts—one individual receives incidental benefits from
another individual; two-way byproducts—two or more individuals receive
incidental benefits from each other; and byproduct reciprocity—where an
individual maximizes incidental benefits it receives from another by actively
helping that individual.
Each of these models have been proposed before (Hamilton 1964a, 1964b;
Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza 1982; Queller 1985; Bull and Rice 1991; Noë and
Hammerstein 1994, 1995; Connor 1995a, 1995b; Frank 1995, 2003; Noë 2001;
Wilkinson and Sherratt 2001; Simms and Taylor 2002), but without the overall
structure presented here. We attempt to provide a comprehensive hierarchy of
models in which each model invokes the fewest assumptions required to evolve (or
maintain) cooperation and does not invoke any of the other models. This emphasis
on “minimal” models stands in contrast to some other approaches. In particular,
Noë (whose approach shares similarities with ours) has developed a framework
around “biological markets” (Noë and Hammerstein 1994, 1995; Noë 2001).
Markets combine several models present in our framework and thus can be
dissected with our approach. Frank (1995, 2003) has developed a framework
around policing (repression of competition), which we dissect and reclassify under
several models below. Likewise, as we will explain below, the collection of
examples that have been lumped under the well-known “iterated prisoner’s
dilemma” model are subdivided here into partner choice and partner fidelity
feedback. We first introduce the models for the evolution of cooperation, then
apply that framework to specific examples of cooperation to identify the
mechanisms driving cooperation in each case.
Directed Reciprocation
In directed reciprocation, an individual accepts a cost to benefit a specific
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partner, and the partner in turn compensates or reciprocates that benefit back to the
donating individual (hence the reciprocation is “directed” to the partner). To
anticipate the other models in our framework, directed reciprocation is
distinguished from shared genes because it can operate between nonrelatives and
between species, and it is distinguished from byproduct benefits because the
cooperative traits are potentially costly, not directly benefiting the individual
expressing them.
Of these three classes of models, directed reciprocation best epitomizes the
Darwinian dilemma, because most examples involve adaptations in one species that
benefit another species. Furthermore, the mere fact that directed reciprocation has
been established does not ensure its persistence—these systems are potentially
vulnerable to exploitation, in which an individual receives the benefit from its
partner and then enjoys a further benefit by not reciprocating (also known as
“cheating”). Models that account for the evolution of directed reciprocation must
thus account for the stability of cooperation against cheating.
The iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game is the most celebrated model of
directed reciprocation. The mechanism driving the evolution of cooperation under
this model was first explained by Trivers (1971) but was later developed by
Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). This model has two main requirements: (i) an
extended series of interactions within a pair of individuals, and (ii) the ability of
each individual to vary its behavior in each interaction according to a partner’s
previous action. The conclusion from the Axelrod-Hamilton paper was that the
simple strategy of “tit-for-tat” evolved under a wide range of conditions if the
likelihood of future interactions between the same partners was high. (The tit-for-
tat strategy is the rule of “cooperate when your partner has cooperated in the
previous iteration but refuse to cooperate if your partner did not cooperate in the
previous iteration.”) The Axelrod-Hamilton paper inspired a surge of theoretical
and empirical studies on cooperation, mostly supporting the generality of the
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original conclusions.
Many empirical examples of cooperation were initially interpreted as fitting
this model, including intracellular symbionts, parasite virulence (Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981), the cooperative behavior of fish (Dugatkin 1997), and even
dynamics of WWI trench warfare (Trivers 1985). While there is no question that
the IPD model describes conditions that can favor cooperation, there are few
examples that are now thought to adequately satisfy its assumptions. Many
between-species examples clearly do not fit, such as two-species cooperative
systems that lack long-term interactions between the same partners.
The IPD has two main components: repeated interactions of partners and
the ability of interactants to alter their behavior in response to the other’s action. As
has been realized previously, either component alone can drive the evolution of
cooperation. Our framework for directed reciprocation thus separates these two
components of the IPD into partner fidelity feedback (involving repeated
interactions between partners) and partner choice (differential response to
partners). Connor (1995b) has also partitioned and reclassified examples formerly
interpreted as IPD, but along different lines than ours.
Partner Fidelity Feedback
Two partners (X, Y) are associated for an extended series of either discrete
or continuous exchanges (Figure 1). The association lasts long enough that a
feedback operates: changes to the fitness of individual Y affect the fitness of its
partner X. Thus, by failing to cooperate, individual X ultimately curtails its own
fitness because its partner’s fitness loss feeds back as a fitness loss to X (merely
because its partner cannot provide as much benefit). This feedback is automatic
and, unlike tit-for-tat, does not require recognition or conditional response.
Biological examples to be described below include vertically transmitted
symbionts, commensals and parasites (e.g., mitochondria), and ant-acacia
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symbioses.
It has also been suggested on theoretical grounds that partner fidelity
feedback operates in viscous populations, where spatial structure enforces the long-
term association of different lineages living in proximity to each other (Nowak and
May 1992; Frank 1994; Doebeli and Knowlton 1998). However, theoretical work
in the field of kin-selected cooperation has noted that competition between
neighbors may override selection for cooperation (Taylor and Wilson 1988; West et
al. 2001, 2002a). This latter work, however, studies competition between neighbors
of the same species, and competition may be weaker when cooperative partners are
of different species.
Partner fidelity feedback is not merely an extended series of contests.
Rather it is a coupling of fitness between two individuals through repeated
interactions (Bull and Rice 1991); the fitness effects may extend across
generations, as in vertically transmitted symbionts, or not, as is described below for
ant acacia symbioses. The stability of partner fidelity feedback is strongly
dependent upon the strength of fitness feedback between partners. In theory, fitness
feedback is strongest under uniparental vertical transmission of symbionts, and this
is the application of the model for which there is the greatest empirical support
(Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). However, a number of other factors can facilitate
strong fitness feedback (fitness coupling) between partners. Factors that limit the
dispersal abilities of partners, including high population viscosity, are frequently
discussed mechanisms to facilitate cooperation under partner fidelity feedback
(Nowak and May 1992; Doebeli and Knowlton 1998; but see Taylor and Wilson
1988; West et al. 2001, 2002a). Partner fidelity feedback is also facilitated if small
short-term fitness gains by cheating result in a large fitness loss to the partner.
Thus, the negative effect of cheating on partner fitness increases disproportionately
with the degree of exploitation. This is a common assumption in models of
virulence evolution (discussed below).
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Partner fidelity feedback differs from the explicit IPD in two basic ways.
First, under partner fidelity feedback, interaction between partners involves
automatic fitness feedback. Under the rules of the IPD, a cheater paired with a
cooperator achieves the highest fitness attainable. In partner fidelity feedback a
cheater’s fitness declines by failing to maintain its cooperative partner’s fitness.
Second, in partner fidelity feedback no choice of partners is required to stabilize
cooperation, and cheaters fail to receive benefits solely because of the automatic
fitness feedback. The IPD, however, leads to maintenance of cooperation only with
a conditional strategy for reciprocation (e.g., tit for- tat), which involves an element
of partner choice manifested as termination of the cooperation.
Partner Choice
An individual X interacts with and rewards a specific cooperative partner Y
and avoids rewarding less cooperative partners (Figure 2). By choosing a
cooperative partner Y, individual X not only enhances its own fitness but it
promotes the evolution of cooperation in species Y. This latter effect occurs
because X selectively benefits cooperative individuals of Y through its cooperation.
(However, it should be emphasized that X is selected to choose a cooperative
partner only because of the immediate benefit to itself and not through the effect it
has on Y’s fitness.) Choice may take several forms, ranging from establishing
cooperation with only one of several potential partners, to altering the duration of
cooperation with a partner according to its actions, to actually reducing the fitness
of selfish partners. Thus, partner choice differs from the IPD in one critical respect:
partners need not interact repeatedly for cooperation to be maintained by partner
choice. Cooperation can evolve by partner choice even if individuals interact only
once.
Partner choice is easy to contemplate as a mechanism for the evolution of
cooperation, but several quantitative factors determine whether it is sufficient to
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maintain cooperation (Bull and Rice 1991; Noë and Hammerstein 1994; Batali and
Kitcher 1995; Noë 2001). For example, there is an inherent density dependence in
which choices become more limited when few partners are available than when
many are available (Noë and Hammerstein 1994; Noë 2001). That is, the costs of
rejecting a potential partner are lower if many alternative partners are available.
Partner choice involves both an assessment of how cooperative a partner is
and a decision rule about whether to accept exchange with that partner (and how
much to exchange). Decision rules may be relative, “accept the most cooperative
individuals,” or absolute “accept any partner above some value” (West et al.
2002b). Decision rules may be behavioral, as with partner choice in baboons (Noë
1990), or chemical, as is in the yucca-yucca moth symbiosis discussed below. “Tit-
for-tat,” for example, is a type of decision rule commonly modeled in the IPD.
Decision rules are often coupled with an assessment system. The
assessment system is the biological arena in which one or more potential partners
are observed for their cooperative tendencies, such that their level of cooperation in
further interactions can be predicted. While a decision rule is the basis by which an
individual chooses a partner, the assessment system allows an individual to gain
information about which partners are cooperative and how cooperative they are.
Three different assessment systems have been described in the empirical literature:
parceling, distributing, and image scoring. In parceling, a single resource is
presented to a partner incrementally, over time (Connor 1995b). A simple example
of parceling involves grooming in impalas (Connor 1995b) in which individuals
exchange short bouts of grooming in pairs. A cheating individual, in this case a
nongrooming impala, can at best exploit a single grooming bout before its selfish
tendencies are revealed. The choosing partner then avoids spending time grooming
the selfish partner. Parceling is an integral part of the classic IPD model—it
represents the iterations.
Yucca plants use a distributing assessment system to evaluate the
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cooperative tendencies of their obligate pollinating moths. Distributing is a spatial
portioning of the resource. Moths oviposit into the ovary before pollinating the
flower, and the developing seeds are used as food by the larvae. Uncooperative
moths lay more than the average number of eggs per flower, thus lowering plant
fitness. Yucca assessment is thought to depend on the number of larvae within each
ovary. In contrast to parceling, there is no sequential exchange of benefits over
time: if the plant aborts the flower, then both the plant and the moth lose all
offspring from that flower (Pellmyr and Huth 1994; Huth and Pellmyr 2000). In
contrast to parceling, therefore, distributing divides a resource into spatial
allotments rather than temporal allotments. Distributing further differs from
parceling in that the decision rule may act separately in each allotment (e.g., ovary).
While a decision in parceling is made one partner at a time, decisions in
distributing can be made simultaneously upon many partners.
A third type of assessment system, image scoring (Nowak and Sigmund
1998), exists in reef fish that choose among “cleaner fish” (Bshary 2002). Some
species of reef fish, termed clients, benefit from cleaner fish that remove and eat
their mouth parasites or dead infected tissue (Grutter 1999). However, the cleaner
may cheat the client by biting healthy tissue off the client instead of, or in addition
to, the removal of parasites (Bshary and Grutter 2002). Some species of client fish
choose cleaners after observing the cleaner’s behavior with a previous client;
clients choose cleaners that they observe to be cooperative (Bshary 2002). This
form of cooperation has been termed image scoring (Nowak and Sigmund 1998;
Riolo et al. 2001) or more generally “indirect reciprocity” (Alexander 1987); a
benevolent act by X to Y increases the chance that X receives benefit from others.
A History of Partner Choice
Partner choice is clearly a widespread evolutionary mechanism for
cooperation, yet it is neglected in many reviews. This omission seems to stem from
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a widespread emphasis on the IPD as the model for the evolution of cooperation
between unrelated individuals. Historically, however, partner choice underlies
Darwin’s contemplation on the evolution of nectaries in flowers (1859:139, see
below), Dawkins’s model of female choice of males differing in levels of paternal
care of the brood (1976), the fig-wasp model described by Axelrod and Hamilton
(1981), Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza’s (1982) model of assortment of encounters, and
Bell’s model for the evolution of empty flowers (1986). Nonetheless, both Dawkins
(1989) and Axelrod and Hamilton attempted to use the IPD to explain the evolution
of cooperation where repeated interactions were absent, and Bull and Rice (1991)
included one model involving partner choice under partner fidelity (feedback),
illustrating the common difficulty and confusion over these mechanisms.
Noë (1990) proposed that certain types of choice-based games in baboons
constituted an alternative to the IPD model as a way to maintain cooperation. Bull
and Rice (1991) proposed the two basic models we recognize here, partner choice
and partner fidelity (feedback). Noë and Hammerstein and their collaborators have
since elaborated variations of partner choice and illustrated that the efficacy of
choice increases with the number of partners in a density dependent manner (Noë
and Hammerstein 1994, 1995; Noë 2001).
We view some group-level selection models of active assortative
interactions as partner choice models (Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza 1982; Peck 1993;
Wilson and Dugatkin 1997). Choice of partners by individuals can drive the
assortative interactions of cooperators. Assorted interaction then leads to between
group variance, and thus could allow selection to favor some groups over others.
These models may be particularly predictive for within-species cooperation, though




Cooperation by shared genes occurs when one individual benefits another
individual with which it shares alleles through descent from a common ancestor.
By definition, this mechanism operates only when the partners are members of the
same species. A shared genes model for the evolution of cooperation (altruism) was
first proposed and developed quantitatively in the classic papers of Hamilton
(1964a, 1964b). In Hamilton’s model, interactions occur among relatives, and
evolved cooperative acts are directed toward other individuals, depending on the
average degrees of relatedness of those individuals (Figure 3). Thus, genes that
encode for (shared genes) cooperation tend to benefit copies of themselves in others
(Dawkins 1976). Shared genes cooperation differs from all other models considered
here in that the cooperative individual need not benefit from its act. This section is
included in our review for completeness but is otherwise brief, since this subject
already has several excellent reviews (Queller 2000; Alonso and Schuck-Paim
2002; West et al. 2002a).
We recognize two classes of mechanisms by which an individual
preferentially gives benefits to others with shared genes: kin fidelity and kin choice.
This distinction highlights the different mechanisms by which cooperative acts are
directed to kin and the divergent ways that shared genes cooperation may be
vulnerable to cheating. Kin fidelity versus kin choice have been variously described
as passive versus active assortment (Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza 1982), spatial
association versus kin recognition (Grosberg and Quinn 1986), spatial location
mechanism versus phenotype matching (Reeve 1989), and phenotypic versus
nonphenotypic kin recognition (Pfennig 1997), though the context of these various
terms are not always completely overlapping. This structure is obviously parallel to
that of directed reciprocation.
Kin Fidelity
With kin fidelity, benefits are given to relatives based on context-dependent
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spatial association, as in offspring sharing a nest (Hamilton 1964a). By definition,
no recognition of individuals per se is involved, because the act is performed to
benefit individuals nearby. Although kin fidelity originally seemed to be an
obvious mechanism for kin selection, it has recently been challenged as a sufficient
mechanism to promote cooperation. The main problem is that relatives living in
close proximity may also compete for common resources, and competition between
close relatives can overwhelm selection for cooperation (Taylor and Wilson 1988;
West et al. 2001, 2002a). Despite this problem, kin fidelity may be important in the
evolution of cooperation, especially where kin recognition systems are unable to
evolve (Crespi 2001).
Perhaps the first kin fidelity hypothesis was Fisher’s model (1930) for the
evolution of aposematism through the clustering of brightly colored sibling larvae.
A predator tasting the first larva would learn to avoid the siblings because of their
spatial proximity and similar appearance. This model has since received empirical
support: in experiments, two predator species learned to avoid a conspicuous-
distasteful species of aphid while continuing to eat a cryptic-tasteful species after
limited experience with both (Malcolm 1986). The aposematic aphids live in large
familial congregations, so the kin-selected benefits of aposematism are only
received by nearby relatives, as in Fisher’s model.
Another unambiguous example of kin fidelity is revealed in the experiment
of Turner and Chao (1999), in which a bacteriophage evolved lower levels of
selfishness when bacteria were infected with phage clone mates than when infected
with nonclone mates. The level of kin fidelity is merely the extent that bacteria
were coinfected by related phage genotypes versus unrelated genotypes, and the
results showed that higher levels of kin fidelity selected higher levels of
cooperation.
For many birds that invest significantly in their brood, parents often feed or
incubate whichever young are in that parent’s nest, even when those young are not
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their offspring (as in cuckholdry or experimental crossfostering). This
fundamentally involves kin fidelity rather than kin choice. In contrast to the two
preceding examples, however, there is a certain level of recognition required:
parents recognize their nest even if not their offspring in that nest. Hence this
example has also been classified as nonphenotypic recognition (Pfennig 1997).
Kin fidelity is vulnerable to a specific kind of cheating because a nonkin
individual can receive kin fidelity benefits simply by being present in the correct
context or location, as in the brood parasitic birds just described. Kin fidelity is no
doubt important in many contexts: even when proximity leads to competition, kin
fidelity may moderate the competitive interactions of relatives.
Kin Choice
Individuals benefit others whose phenotypes indicate shared genes. Kin
choice implies (kin) recognition, and the mechanisms of recognition are diverse.
There are two dimensions to kin recognition: which phenotypes are used in
recognition, and how the discrimination is acquired. The phenotypes include visual
or auditory cues as well as odors, pheromones, and other diffusible chemicals
(Greenberg 1979; Gamboa et al. 1986, 1996). Most commonly, the recognition is
acquired by learning some type of environmental cue (Gamboa et al. 1986; Neff
and Sherman 2002), and this learning often has elements of kin fidelity (because
the individuals who are learned as kin are neighbors). One example of kin choice
that does not involve kin fidelity comes from colonial tunicates that fuse to form
colonies. The fusion systems typically exclude nonrelatives from colonies, and this
“choice” appears to be based solely on heritable cues (Grosberg and Quinn 1986;
Rinkevich and Weissman 1992; Bishop and Sommerfeldt 1999).
Although learned recognition may blur our distinction between kin choice
and kin fidelity, it operates in most animals with kin recognition (Pfennig 2002).
Learned discrimination often has elements of kin fidelity, because the individuals
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learned as kin are those of the same nest or other immediate environment. Kin
recognition is often learned simply by exposure, so that an individual’s specific
phenotype becomes familiar. Experiments involving exposure of naive social
wasps to nonkin nests have shown that nonkin can become accepted and that
quarantined kin can be forgotten and excluded (Pfennig et al. 1983). In wood frogs,
naive individuals kept free of variable environmental cues prefer kin to nonkin,
suggesting an intrinsic ability to discriminate. However, this effect is overcome by
exposing nonkin groups to similar environmental cues, whence they now recognize
each other as kin (Gamboa et al. 1991).
Although recognition can be based on a phenotype that reflects kinship per
se (whole genome relatedness), it can also be based on specific genes that are the
true targets of selection. A case in point is what has been described as “green
beard” selection (Hamilton 1964a). Three properties are required for green-beard
selection: (i) a gene which causes a phenotypic effect; (ii) recognition of the
phenotype; and (iii) differential behavior by bearers of the gene to those with the
phenotype (Hamilton 1964a). In this model, first proposed merely as a hypothetical
principle, benefits are directed to individuals who are phenotypically recognized as
carrying the cooperative gene(s). The interacting individuals need not be kin per se
(may not share whole-genome relatedness), but the recognized phenotype enables
the benefits to be bestowed directly on the genes affecting the cooperation. (We
include the green-beard model in this section on kin choice for convenience, even
though it does not require choice of kin per se.) Green-beard mechanisms may
operate to specifically reward individuals carrying the proper genes, or to harm
individuals that lack those genes, regardless of how many alleles individuals share
throughout the rest of the genome. Empirical work matches the predictions of
green-beard selection for the fire ant Gp-9 locus (Keller and Ross 1998), M-factors
in flour beetles (Beeman et al. 1992), and cell adhesion genes in social amoebae
(Queller et al. 2003). As far as we know, all the above examples of green beard are
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pure examples of kin choice; they work irrespective of environmental or context
dependent cues.
In contrast to kin fidelity, kin choice can be exploited by nonkin that
imposter as of mimic relatives (Alexander and Borgia 1978). We are unaware of
exploitation of this specific type, but it may well exist. One interesting line of
research will be to study specifically how cooperation is stabilized against cheaters
in each case, and whether recognition or proximity maintains cooperation between
relatives.
Byproduct benefits
Byproduct models have only recently been emphasized in the cooperation
literature. They are potentially confusing because they do not obviously qualify as
cooperation in the classic sense, but they overlap with cases that clearly do qualify.
Byproduct benefits are integral parts of some cooperation systems, and they likely
formed the origins of many systems that evolved into more elaborate cooperative
interactions. We distinguish three categories.
One-Way Byproduct Benefit: No Evolution of Cooperation
The benefit that Y receives is an automatic consequence of the otherwise
selfish act in which individual X does something to benefit itself (West-Eberhard
1975; Brown 1983; Figure 4). For example, the feces from large ungulates are food
for dung beetles; vultures and carrion-feeding insects benefit from abandoned lion
kills. Following Connor (1995b), there has been no evolution of cooperation per se
in these cases. That is, lion behavior has not been evolutionarily modified to benefit
vultures or other carrion feeders, and vulture behavior has not evolved to increase
the chance of a kill. Whatever evolves in the case of this byproducts model, it is not
selected to offer a cooperative act. In byproduct models, there is no potential
Darwinian dilemma, because the basic cooperative trait directly benefits its bearer
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and only incidentally benefits others.
Two-Way Byproduct Benefits: Byproduct Mutualism
Byproduct benefits can be one sided, in which X performs an act that
benefits itself and coincidentally benefits another, Y, but benefits may also go in
both directions to give byproduct “mutualisms” (West-Eberhard 1975; Brown
1983; Figure 4). Two-way byproducts can be simple extensions of one-way
examples, or can promote group behavior. One general class of byproduct
mutualism is synergism: actions or coordinated behaviors that are automatically
more profitable when performed in groups (Queller 1985), such as flocking, selfish
herds (Hamilton 1971), and Mullerian mimicry (Connor 1995a). Synergism has the
appealing and simple formulation that group behavior evolves via individual
selection whenever benefits increase disproportionately with group size. As a
specific example, empirical work on aquatic hemipterans, which congregate in
large groups, suggests that per capita predation risk decreases with group size
(Foster and Treherne 1981). Thus, an individual joining a group reduces its own per
capita predation rate as well as reducing the per capita predation rate of the other
group members through simple predator dilution (Foster and Treherne 1981).
Everyone benefits, and no special mechanism for “cooperation” need be invoked.
Although controversial in the details, cooperative founding of colonies
between unrelated ant queens also fits the requirements of byproduct mutualisms,
because grouped queens automatically achieve higher mean (expected) fitness than
solitary females (reviewed in Bernasconi and Strassmann 1999). Two-way
byproduct cooperation also extends to examples of “helping at the nest” by
unrelated individuals. At least 300 species of birds exhibit cooperative breeding, in
which some individuals forgo independent nesting to act instead as helpers at a
conspecific’s nest (Arnold and Owens 1998). In some cooperatively breeding birds,
the helpers are unrelated to the individuals they assist in raising young (Cockburn
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1998). Recent work on cooperatively breeding warblers showed that unrelated
helpers gained significantly more direct fitness benefits via breeding opportunities
than through indirect fitness benefits (Richardson et al. 2002). Thus, the benefits
that other birds receive from the unrelated helpers is a byproduct of the helpers’
pursuit of direct fitness benefits.
Maximizing Byproduct Benefits Without Evolving Cooperation
When byproduct benefits exist, individuals may be selected to increase the
benefit they can obtain. Evolution of byproducts may take the form of “harvesting”
the byproduct benefits without benefiting the partner that produces the benefit. As
an imaginative example, dung beetles might evolve to search for large mammals
that provide dung, limiting their foraging to the vicinity of these animals. There
would be no specific evolution of cooperation —promoting a benefit to another
individual—but this evolution may increase the appearance of the cooperation
because the “harvesting” individual has undergone evolutionary modification to
increase its dependence on the byproduct.
Byproduct Reciprocity: Evolution of Cooperation from Byproducts
When one individual (X) receives automatic byproduct benefits from
another individual (Y), natural selection can shape X to maximize these benefits by
being cooperative toward Y. The greater cooperation toward Y yields greater
byproduct benefits from Y (pseudoreciprocity: Connor 1986; Figure 5). For
example, consider the remarkable case of the greater honeyguide, an African bird
that guides humans to beehives for collection of honey (Hoesch 1937; Isack and
Reyer 1989). In Africa, humans have foraged for beehives for many thousands of
years. As a consequence of diminishing returns during hive destruction, there is
generally honey left behind after human foraging (Dean et al. 1990). Upon
destruction of the hive by the human, the bird forages on the discarded hive
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remnants, and thus receives automatic benefits as a byproduct of the human
foragers’ selfish act. Presumably to maximize this benefit, the bird has evolved to
call the humans and lead them to beehive locations. Although the coevolutionary
history of this apparent human-bird mutualism is speculative (Dean et al. 1990), the
inescapable conclusion is that this bird behavior evolved to benefit another species
because the bird is incapable of attacking an intact hive by itself. The behavior of
the other species in turn benefits the bird. No special mechanisms are needed to
prevent exploitation of bird behavior, because the cooperator (human)
automatically returns the benefit by unavoidably leaving scraps of the hive behind.
Why is byproduct reciprocity not prone to exploitation? For all examples of
byproduct reciprocity known to us, the underlying feature is a common resource
not totally monopolizable by either party: each interactant is assured adequate
benefits. For example, the honeyguide requires only a small fraction of the hive,
which is unavoidably left over during dismemberment of the hive by humans;
honeyguiding behavior would presumably not have evolved if humans harvested
entire hives without leaving scraps. A parallel case is food sharing in social cliff
swallows, which alert conspecifics when insect swarms are found. Efficient group
tracking of swarms can benefit the caller through increased foraging (Brown et al.
1991).
EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES OF COOPERATION
We now review examples of cooperation in nature, illustrating the
application of this framework. Our examples focus heavily on partner fidelity
feedback and partner choice because the other examples, listed in the tables below,
do not present the difficulties in interpretation that directed reciprocation does.
Some systems of interspecific cooperation involve multiple mechanisms.
Furthermore, for a given cooperative interaction between species, the mechanism
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maintaining cooperation in one species may differ from the mechanism maintaining
cooperation in the other species.
Partner fidelity feedback: a diversity of contexts
Organelles and Maternally Inherited Microorganisms
Strong partner fidelity feedback (PFF) exists between eukaryotes and their
vertically transmitted bacteria-derived symbionts, such as mitochondria and
chloroplasts. The evolution of these symbionts has been sometimes accompanied
by extreme reduction in gene content and genome size of the bacterial symbionts,
and by tight interdependence of physiologies between the symbiont and host cell
(Palmer 1997; Moran and Wernegreen 2000). Axelrod and Hamilton considered
this case under the IPD game (1981), but in most cases there is no element of
choice (e.g., mitochondria cannot be rejected) and cooperation is maintained
entirely by PFF.
Parasite Virulence Evolution
One of the most prominent applications of the PFF principle has been to
understand the evolution of virulence in infectious diseases. Beginning with Fine
(1975), Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), Anderson and May (1982), and Ewald
(1983), the standard model for the evolution of virulence invokes a strict negative
correlation between the parasite’s propensity to be transmitted and the harm it
causes its host (the virulence). Thus, an increased ability to infect new hosts comes
at the expense of a shorter life span and/or fecundity of the current host (higher
virulence). The optimal virulence along this tradeoff depends on how long the
parasite occupies its current host before it is transmitted to other hosts, the duration
of the infection (limited by the longevity of the infected host and the speed of
immune clearance), whether the populations of infected hosts are expanding or at a
dynamic equilibrium (Lenski and May 1994), and whether the infection is
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transmitted vertically or horizontally (Fine 1975; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). All
of these factors affect the PFF between the parasite and host, and in general, the
greater the PFF, the lower the optimal virulence. For example, a strictly vertically
transmitted parasite can afford but limited virulence (Ewald 1983). PFF is thus a
central part of the framework for understanding the evolution of virulence, although
the extent to which optimal virulence models are supported empirically is not clear
(Ebert and Bull 2003). Note also that these examples focus on PFF from the
perspective of the parasite, not the host, since the host does not benefit from the
infection.
Fungal Endophytes
Various groups of fungi are specialized to invade plant tissues and exist
inside living plants, for example, in the interstitium between leaf cells, or even
inside of cells. Many of these endophytic fungi are parasitic and cause disease
symptoms in the plant host, but others form mutualistic relationships with plants
(Clay 1988; Saikkonen et al. 1998). The best-studied mutualist endophytes are in
grasses, within which the fungi are vertically transmitted via the seeds (Schardl and
Clay 1997). The fungus grows into the seed tissue during seed formation,
subsequently infecting any developing seedling and ultimately the seeds of the next
generation, thus spanning the fungus-host life cycle. The tight vertical transmission
sets up conditions of PFF, and both partners are therefore expected to enhance each
other’s fitness. Indeed, grass endophytes produce secondary compounds (e.g., ergot
alkaloids) that protect the grass host against herbivores; the grass host in turn
provides the fungus with nutrients and facilitates fungal persistence. Investment by
the fungus into secondary compounds thus feeds back via protection of the
nourishing plant host (feedback returning to fungus). Likewise, nutritional
provisioning of the fungus by the host feeds back via increased delivery of
secondary compounds (feedback returning to grass host). Interestingly, horizontally
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transmitted endophytes of plants generally have deleterious effects on their hosts,
consistent with reduced or absent PFF between horizontally transmitted endophytes
and their hosts.
Ants and Acacias
PFF exists in a short-term setting in the mutualism between bullhorn acacia
plants (Mimosoideae) and ants in the genus Pseudomyrmex. The acacia plant grows
chambers to house ants and provides protein and lipid rich “Beltian” bodies that
nourish the ants (Belt 1874). In turn, the ants attack animals that contact the plant,
preventing loss from herbivory. The ants also remove local vegetation in the
immediate vicinity of the plant to reduce competition (Belt 1874; Janzen 1966).
From the perspective of PFF, plant protection by the ants ensures the ants a future
home and food supply that would not exist (or not be as extensive) if herbivores
were allowed to reign freely on the plant. Likewise, the plant promotes positive
feedback to its fitness by providing a home and food for the ants living on it. This
PFF can only operate when plants are a limiting resource for the ants, so that ants
cannot completely exhaust resources of the current plant and then move on to a new
plant.
Although fitnesses in PFF are often coupled between partners across
generations (as in the case of the endophytes), PFF does not operate across
generations in the ant-acacia case. Each new plant starts from seed and must be
colonized by ants, and those ants do not necessarily come from the parent plant
producing the seeds. These short-term PFFs are less intrinsically stable than across-
generation cases. For example, the ant-acacia system is ultimately maintained
because plants attended by ants enjoy enhanced reproductive success. If ants
evolved to consume flowers and all seeds of the plants they attended, the short-term
PFF would continue to operate and benefit the growth of existing adult plants as
well as the ants, but recruitment of new plants would decline until the system
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collapsed when the acacia goes extinct. Plant castration occasionally occurs in a
related ant-plant symbiosis, and the plant minimizes this cheating by restricting ant
domatias (hollow structures that house ants) to certain parts of the plants (Izzo and
Vasconcelos 2002). Finally, some plant-ants are effectively parasites on their plants
( Janzen 1975) and recent work by Stanton et al. (1999) proposes that this
parasitism is favored by a high density of ant trees. This supports the prediction that
PFF can only occur in this system when plants are a limiting resource for ants.
Thus, the success of PFF in maintaining cooperation must ultimately be assessed
for its consequences across generations, even if the feedback operates on a shorter
time scale.
Partner choice could also operate in this system, depending on the
availability of empty plants. Ants whose plant “cheated” them and did not provide
a home or food for them could potentially move out in search of a new home, rather
than die with the current plant. Also, PFF would fail to operate if ant turnover was
high, because ants that did not remain in their home for long would be unlikely to
reap the return benefits of maintaining it (akin to arguments about the evolution of
parasite virulence under high levels of horizontal transmission). Thus, depending
on environment and relative abundances of the two partner species, the ant-acacia
system could potentially exhibit a turnover of mechanisms from pure PFF, to a mix
of PFF and partner choice, to a destabilization of cooperation.
Breakdown of Partner Fidelity Feedback
The automatic feedback of PFF can operate at different levels of
organization and different time scales, and is correspondingly vulnerable to
exploitation. Specifically, PFF may sporadically break down when one of the
partners has a different generation time than the other. For example, and perhaps
surprisingly, mitochondria are the cause of some profoundly deleterious
phenotypes, such as male sterility in plants (Schnable and Wise 1998) and some
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degenerative diseases of aging (Wallace 1999). The evolution of mitochondrial
male sterility derives from the fact that the PFF between mitochondria and host is
matrilineal, so sons do not contribute positively to the feedback loop of
mitochondrial fitness. Moreover, mitochondrial diseases of aging may be due to
within-cell evolution of the mitochondrial population. This is a consequence of the
within-cell evolution of mitochondria operating faster than the between host
evolution of cooperation (akin to cancer in this respect). PFF still operates and
stabilizes host mitochondrion cooperation over the long run, but some invasion of
cheater mitochondria can be expected, given their faster evolutionary rate and their
resulting temporary liberation from PFF.
Partner choice: many enigmas resolved
In partner choice, individuals engage in one or more exchanges in which
one partner can vary its response to accept or exclude the other partner. The
strongest data for partner choice in a cooperative interaction is a variable and
effective response to alternative partners. These data are not trivial to generate, but
such responses are being worked out in elegant detail in two eukaryote-bacterial
symbioses described below: the legume-rhizobium symbiosis and the bobtail squid-
Vibrio fischeri symbiosis.
One of the biggest difficulties in exploring and understanding natural
systems of cooperation is that partner choice, which is evidently rampant, is
inherently density dependent and cannot operate effectively unless the preferred
chosen partners are common (Noë and Hammerstein 1994; Noë 2001). Thus for
systems in which the chosen partner is at least sporadically uncommon (Nuismer et
al. 2000), cooperation may need to be supplemented by another mechanism, or
otherwise the choosing partner may be exploited (see Bshary 2001 for this effect in
cleaner fish). However, partner choice has the advantage over partner fidelity
feedback in that, once established, it can work to the individual’s benefit over short
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time-scales (e.g., within generations). In contrast, many cases of partner fidelity
feedback operate through differential reproductive success of the interacting
lineages, hence across generations.
Yuccas and Yucca Moths
Yucca plants (Agavaceae), the plant family that includes Spanish daggers,
have a highly specialized and largely obligate mutualism (Pellmyr and Thompson
1992). Yucca flowers require pollination by a yucca moth, and in return the
developing yucca fruit provides an essential resource for the moth larvae. The
larvae consume developing seeds and so reduce plant seed set directly. Thus, there
is a potential evolutionary conflict in which moths try to maximize egg loads while
the plant tries to maximize the number of developed seeds (Pellmyr and Huth
1994). Since the yucca system was first described, various intricacies have been
discovered that paint a complicated picture for the maintenance of these systems
(Pellmyr and Huth 1994; West and Herre 1994; Herre and West 1997; Huth and
Pellmyr 1999, 2000; Marr et al. 2001).
In the “basic” mutualism, the moth gathers pollen from one or more
flowers, typically flies to a new plant, oviposits into a flower, and then (often)
pollinates that flower before moving to other flowers on the same plant (Huth and
Pellmyr 1999). Moth species that exhibit this type of behavior could potentially
violate the mutualism in two ways. First, they could oviposit but fail to pollinate.
This is in fact a common but puzzling behavior, because unpollinated flowers do
not develop and thus are dead ends for the offspring of the nonpollinating moths.
However, at high moth density, an oviposited flower will sometimes be pollinated
by another moth, which could save the eggs of a moth that did not pollinate. A
second type of violation is to lay excessive numbers of eggs per flower, such that
the plant produces few or no seeds (the same effect would be achieved by
ovipositing in flowers with eggs deposited by another moth). Through selective
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maturation of fruit with low moth egg loads and high pollen loads the plant has a
partner choice mechanism to reward moths that do not overload plant ovaries with
larvae (Pellmyr and Huth 1994; Huth and Pellmyr 2000). A high percentage of
flowers are normally abscised early; floral abortion not only prevents seed
development, it also kills all moth larvae in that flower (Marr et al. 2001). The
“choice” is discriminatory in that pollinated flowers with many oviposition scars
are more likely to be abscised than those with few scars (Pellmyr and Huth 1994;
Huth and Pellmyr 2000). The plant is thus able to ensure that seeds are produced,
although the final distribution of egg loads per ovary may vary with the density of
moths. In order for the plant to exercise choice, one would expect that the plants
have evolved to produce initially more ovaries than they can actually support,
allowing the plant to eliminate the least desirable flowers and thus select against the
most undesirable moths.
Virtually nothing is known about how the plant is prevented from cheating
the moth, which could be any form of killing the larvae while retaining pollinated
ovaries. An additional complication is that there are moths that do not exhibit the
above form of mutualism. Nonpollinating “parasitic” moth species are known that
lay eggs in developing ovaries, after the plant has made its choice of which ovaries
to abort (West and Herre 1994; Pellmyr et al. 1996). These parasites can only be
maintained in the presence of the mutualists. Yet other species pollinate flowers but
lay eggs near the surface of the ovary (Pellmyr and Leebens-Mack 2000). These
scars do not affect the plant’s abscission decision, so it is not known how the
fecundity of these (apparently mutualistic) moths is maintained at an acceptable
level.
Squid Light Organs
The symbiosis between the bobtail squid, Euprymna scolopes, and the
luminescent bacterium, Vibrio fischeri, is an elegantly studied example of partner
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choice. The squid houses luminescent V. fischeri cells in a specialized light organ
on its mantle. The bacteria benefit from maximal growth conditions in the light
organ, conditions that can barely be improved upon in lab cultures (Boettcher and
Ruby 1990). The nocturnal foraging squid (Berry 1912) probably uses the bacteria
in a camouflaging behavior called counterillumination (McFall-Ngai 1990). Partner
fidelity feedback via vertical transmission across generations is unlikely to occur
because squids are born symbiont free and acquire their bacteria from the
environment (Wei and Young 1989). There is no evidence that adults remain near
their eggs (Singley 1983), nor that there are sufficient bacteria on the coating of the
eggs to inoculate them (see Ruby and Lee 1998), thus there is no evidence for PFF.
However, partner choice appears to occur at two steps in the interaction: initiation
and maintenance of the symbiosis.
Initiation—For the squid, initiation of the interaction is specific to the
bacterial species level, and even between strains (McFall-Ngai and Ruby 1991).
While the light organ tissues remain open to new strains after initial infection (Lee
and Ruby 1994a), they are resistant to all other marine bacteria but V. fischeri
(McFall-Ngai and Ruby 1991) and its congener V. logei (Ruby 1996). A surface
peptide on the bacterium plays a critical role in its recognition by a squid host and
the specificity of the interaction (Hensey and McFall-Ngai 1992).
Maintenance—Once V. fischeri infects the squids, the mechanisms of
partner choice are both elegant and specific. Even if hosts are infected with a single
strain, new strains could arise through mutation or superinfection, so partner choice
must also occur after initial infection, particularly since the bacteria are evolving
faster than the host. Each morning, squids expel 90% to 95% of their symbiont
population into the environment (Lee and Ruby 1994b), the remaining symbionts
being tightly bound to microvillus structures lining the light organ (Montgomery
and McFall- Ngai 1994). Although differential retention may be a mechanism for
partner choice, no work has specifically addressed this aspect. However, there is
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intriguing evidence that the squid can select directly on luminescence as a bacterial
trait. Visick et al. (2000) developed several mutant V. fischeri strains, defective for
either the luciferase enzyme or a step in its regulation. These mutants were unable
to completely colonize the light organs of the squids unless luciferase activity was
replaced experimentally. An elegant mechanism has been hypothesized for how the
host can choose specific partners based on their luciferase activity. The crypts of
the squid light organs produce poisonous concentrations of peroxidase (McFall-
Ngai and Hensey 1992), which may function to act specifically against
nonluminous strains. Because the functioning bacterial luciferase has a higher
binding affinity for oxygen than for the peroxidases, luminous strains may escape
the effects of the deadly poison (Visick et al. 2000). Ruby (1996) pointed out that,
of the thousands of V. fischeri strains isolated from bobtail squids, no nonluminous
strain has been found. Thus, partner choice seems to be an effective mechanism
selecting against light cheaters in the V. fischeri / E. scolopes symbiosis.
The Legume-Rhizobium Symbiosis
The legume-rhizobium symbiosis offers a near parallel to the squid-Vibrio
system described above, with partner choice occurring at both initiation and
maintenance of the symbiosis. Legumes form symbioses with rhizobial bacteria
that fix atmospheric nitrogen into organic form. The rhizobia reside as
differentiated bacteroids harbored within root swellings called nodules. Plants
usually benefit from this interaction, as nitrogen is often a factor limiting their
growth (Tamm 1991), but it is difficult to measure the benefits to rhizobia. Studies
show that there are higher concentrations of rhizobia surrounding symbiotic
legumes (Reyes and Schmidt 1979; Kuykendall 1989), but evidence is scant
beyond this (reviewed in Denison 2000; Simms and Taylor 2002). Partner fidelity
feedback is unlikely to be a force in this system: rhizobia are not transmitted
directly from parent to offspring but are spread between plants in the soil, and most
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plants are infected with several strains (Dowling and Broughton 1986).
Experiments show much more bacterial genetic diversity within plants than
between them (Hagen and Hamrick 1996).
Initiation—Two factors contribute to legume choice of rhizobia at the
initiation of the interaction (Simms and Taylor 2002). Host plants produce
flavonoids that are specifically recognized and matched by some rhizobial strains,
and transcriptional regulators (NodD factors) on rhizobia induce critical stages of
infection (Perret et al. 2000). Though strain specificity at initiation is important, it
is unlikely to be immune to cheating (Denison 2000; Simms and Taylor 2002; West
et al. 2002b).
Maintenance—Recent work has suggested that cooperation is maintained
via postinfection legume sanctions of nonsymbiotic rhizobial strains (Denison
2000; Simms and Taylor 2002; West et al. 2002b; Kiers et al. 2003). Experimental
evidence suggests that legumes punish nonfixing strains through limiting oxygen
supply (Uvardi and Kahn 1993; Kiers et al. 2003). It seems likely that the elegant
research on this system will soon unravel the mechanistic basis underlying
rhizobial cooperation.
A Rule About Partner Choice?
Partner choice between species often operates on just one side of a
mutualism. In particular, if there is an asymmetry in population size and/or
generation time, the chosen partner is typically the one with the more rapid
generation time and larger population size. There may be a meaningful generality
in this pattern: that choice is a mechanism that the more slowly evolving species
can use against the more rapid evolutionary changes of the partner. At present, we
can offer no more than speculation of the possible existence or significance of such
a pattern.
31
Multiple mechanisms and potential puzzles
The application of our framework to even a modest number of examples
from nature leads quickly to the realization that multiple mechanisms operate in
many systems. In many cases, for example, one species uses partner choice to
prevent exploitation, but the other partner species relies on a different mechanism.
A system may also involve multiple mechanisms within one of the partner species.
For some of the systems we analyze below, the evolution of cooperation is not well
understood. We apply our framework to illustrate what kind of data need to be
gathered to identify the mechanisms maintaining cooperation in each system.
Generalized Animal Pollinators of Nectar-Producing Flowers
An example of cooperation that is familiar to everyone is the use of insects
or vertebrates as pollen vectors for flowering plants. The flower offers the
pollinator nectar or other reward, and the pollinator deposits pollen to fertilize the
flower and/or carries pollen off from that flower in search of other flower rewards.
The degrees of sophistication and specialization in this relationship vary widely
across plant species, from largely nonspecific pollinators of sunflowers to the
highly coevolved systems of euglossine bees and orchids. In most cases, the
delivery and dispensing of pollen by the animal is inadvertent, a byproduct of the
fact that pollen sticks to the pollinator and that the animal cannot easily remove it.
To attract the pollinator, the plant offers a reward in the form of nectar. However,
the pollinator is vulnerable to being cheated (Bell 1986; Gilbert et al. 1991),
because some pollen will already have been deposited before the insect can
determine whether there is a reward present in that flower. Partner choice is at work
in at least some cases: insects (Chittka et al. 1999) and hummingbirds (Waser and
Price 1981; Meléndez-Ackerman et al. 1997; Schemske and Bradshaw 1999)
remember plant characteristics that do and do not offer rewards, such that the
selfish plant receives fewer visits (see Noë 2001 for a model of this effect). As far
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as we know, no work has specifically tested partner choice mechanisms in
pollinators, as work has focused on choice by pollinators between plant species and
according to flower characteristics (Meléndez-Ackerman et al. 1997). It is therefore
unclear how partner choice is operating on individual flowers. Perhaps insects visit
few flowers on a plant if that plant has little nectar, thus potentially reducing plant
fitness through its choice to leave quickly. Interestingly, Darwin (1859) recognized
that partner choice acts in nectar producing flowers (though not identified as such):
“Those individual flowers which had the largest glands or nectaries,
and which excreted most nectar, would be oftenest visited by
insects, and would be oftenest crossed; and so in the long-run would
gain the upper hand. Those flowers, also, which had their stamens
and pistils placed, in relation to the size and habits of the particular
insects which visited them, so as to favour in any degree the
transportal of their pollen from flower to flower, would likewise be
favoured. . . ” (p 139).
In the first sentence Darwin describes partner choice by pollinators; the second
sentence, however, he describes maximization of the byproduct benefits received
by the plants. This latter effect should not be confused with byproduct reciprocity,
since the insect does not necessarily reap benefits from the plant’s specialization.
Leaf-Cutter Ants that Cultivate Gardens
Fungus-growing ants require the cultivation of fungus for food. When
associated with ants, the fungal cultivars are clonally propagated within ant nests,
and also between ant generations through the transfer by foundress queens of clonal
inocula from maternal to offspring nest. Cultivar clones are occasionally exchanged
laterally between different ant nests (Mueller et al. 1998;Adams et al. 2000; Green
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et al. 2002). Associations of ant and fungal lineages thus persist for prolonged
evolutionary times through partner fidelity feedback, but are occasionally
punctuated by novel fungal imports or lateral cultivar transfer.
Partner fidelity feedback is certainly one mechanism that will curb the
spread of unproductive or exploitative “cheater” cultivars, but partner choice is a
second reinforcing mechanism (Mueller 2002). For example, ants may be able to
pick between productive and unproductive cultivars that coexist in a given nest,
using indicators of cultivar productivity(e.g., nutrient level, growth rate).
Behavioral assays in which ants were presented with genetically differentiated
cultivars indicates that attine ants are indeed capable of exerting “symbiont choice”
necessary for the operation of partner choice (Mueller et al.2004). Moreover,
cultivar substitution involving lateral transfer from other nests is inherently based
on partner choice of cultivars selecting for cultivar productivity because: i)the
substituting ants may screen against cultivars that appear suboptimal; and ii)
cultivars are most likely to be picked up from ant lineages with large productive
nests (nests that have nonexploitative cultivars, which are mutualisms that persist
because of partner fidelity feedback). Both partner fidelity feedback and partner
choice thus interact, but both can also operate independently and modulate the
evolution of cooperation between ants and their fungi.
Algal-Invertebrate Symbioses
A wide variety of symbioses are known among tropical marine
invertebrates in which large populations of photosynthetic unicellular algae live
within the tissues of the host (Trench 1993). The majority of the algal symbionts
are dinoflagellates; the hosts include sponges, cnidarians, mollusks, flatworms, and
foraminiferans (Trench 1993). In some species there is evidence that the algae
provide the host with carbohydrates derived from photosynthesis (Balderston and
Claus 1969). The algae, in turn, presumably have access to the rich store of
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nitrogen present in the host tissue, which enables them to reproduce in a protected
environment (Muscatine 1990).
Approximately 85% of corals and other invertebrate host species acquire
their complement of symbionts horizontally, from the external environment rather
than from their parents (Fadlallah 1983; Babcock and Heyward 1986; Harrison and
Wallace 1990). Symbionts available to colonize new hosts likely arise from
neighboring conspecific hosts. Within-host symbiont growth rates are generally in
excess of host growth rates, and some fraction of the excess symbiont population is
expelled into the environment. Expelled symbionts are viable, and are presumably
available to infect additional hosts. Thus, in systems with horizontal transmission,
symbiont within-host fitness can translate into among host fitness. Invertebrate
hosts can harbor one or more species of algal symbiont, with the number of algal
partners varying among host species (Rowan and Knowlton 1995; Baker and
Rowan 1997; Belda-Baille et al. 2001). Changes in the relative abundances of
different symbiont species have been noted for hosts that can simultaneously harbor
multiple symbiont types, particularly when the host is stressed (Rowan and
Knowlton 1995; Baker 2001). However, dynamic symbiont populations are not
found in all hosts (Goulet 1999), and generally little is known about how much
turnover occurs within that intracellular population, either via further colonization
or via competition within the host.
The horizontal transmission and large algal populations within the host
suggests that partner choice may be the mechanism required to maintain
cooperative algae. Variants of algae are known that infect and kill the host or
otherwise retard host growth (Wilcox, personal communication), so a byproduct
benefit seems unlikely as a universal mechanism. The turnover that can occur
within hosts questions whether partner fidelity feedback operates across host
lifetimes, although it may operate early in the critical stages of the host life history
(Wilcox, personal communication). By analogy with the squid-Vibrio and plant-
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rhizobium systems, we should expect that partner choice plays an essential role in
maintaining these dinoflagellate symbioses, but there has been scant investigation
of this possibility. Several experiments have shown that hosts infected with
multiple strains of dinoflagellates ultimately resolve to a single strain, but whether
this resolution is due to the host (choice) or simply competition among
dinoflagellates is not clear (Belda-Baille et al. 2001; Coffroth et al. 2001). Thus, the
forces maintaining symbiont cooperation remain unresolved in these systems.
Policing
As a final example of multiple mechanisms, we consider how our
framework relates to a concept (policing) that has been presented in a different
framework. Frank (1995, 2003) considered policing to be one of the two major
classes of models for the evolution of cooperation. By analogy to human societies,
policing is the imposition of costs by one individual on another in response to their
uncooperative behavior (Frank 1995). Models of policing overlap with several parts
of our framework. We neither defend nor challenge the biological evidence that
policing evolves in ways consistent with Frank’s models, rather we merely
illustrate how the two frameworks overlap.
(i) Partner choice. Virtually all policing models involve some form of
partner choice within species, because one individual imposes a cost/punishment on
specific individuals who are behaving noncooperatively. Models of policing thus
differ in the nature of partner choice and in how the benefits from partner choice
are distributed to others, as described next.
(ii) Shared genes combined with byproduct benefits. In one model that
applies to social Hymenoptera, policing is the consumption of worker-derived eggs
by other workers. It is favored as a worker behavior because it results in queen-laid
eggs automatically replacing worker-laid eggs—the policing individual shares
more genes with queen-laid eggs than with worker-laid eggs (Ratnieks and
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Visscher 1989). The policer thus benefits via shared genes. The main difference
between this policing model and our kin-choice model is that the policing act is not
cooperative between the two interactants. Instead, policing is cooperative to other
workers in the colony (because they too share more genes with queen-laid eggs
than with eggs laid by other workers).
(iii) Byproduct benefits only. In yet another model, group benefit occurs
when the policing action reduces selfish interactions, enhancing group productivity.
Although this mechanism is typically thought to apply in groups with related
members, in principle it can operate when group members are unrelated: by
policing others, an individual directly improves its own fitness through its fair share
of the improved group productivity (Frank, 2003). Noncheating group members
benefit as a byproduct of the selfish action of the policer, and their byproduct
benefit helps maintain the policing.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The study of cooperation has progressed greatly in the past thirty years, and
there are now many evolutionary models to explain a wide array of empirical
systems. Our goal has been to consolidate the models and examples into a
framework of relatively few evolutionary mechanisms. This framework allows the
recognition of parallels between seemingly disparate systems (e.g., rhizobium-
legume mutualisms and squid-bacterial mutualisms), and also suggests studies of
empirical mechanisms to identify the detailed ways that mutualisms are maintained
against exploitation (cheating). Discoveries of new systems are also easily
classified in this system, and those additions may lead to the recognition of new
mechanisms.
Our framework recognizes: (i) directed reciprocation; (ii) shared genes; and
(iii) byproduct benefits as three classes of models for the evolutionary maintenance
37
of cooperation. The perspective of this framework is individual selection (why
cooperating individuals are favored over noncooperators), but most or all of the
underlying mechanisms can be modeled with no loss of generality in various
frameworks (e.g., trait-group selection or policing, as detailed above). Thus, we
suggest that the mechanisms at work here transcend the specific formulation of the
model.
The framework is also a starting point that opens many avenues for further
study, some of which could lead to discoveries that expand the framework or even
change its perceived relevance. We discuss a few unexplored problems that seem
worthy of further attention.
Incorporating other models.
The framework here attempts to organize the known empirical examples.
Several models have been proposed in which cooperation can evolve, but for which
there is scant empirical evidence, and those models have not necessarily been
accommodated here. It would be useful to know whether new models can be
incorporated into this framework; if not, then the search for examples that satisfy
those models could be intensified, and a new framework proposed if examples are
found.
Embedding ecological factors
 The framework attempts to isolate the minimal elements that allow the
maintenance of cooperation within a species or between two species. Yet nearly all
natural examples are embedded in complex ecologies involving multispecies
interactions. How do these ecological dynamics impinge on the evolution of
cooperation? A mild parasite may become a mutualist in the presence of a more
severe parasite, if the mild parasite can prevent infection by the severe one or
reduce its harmful effect. How do the dynamics of the two parasites affect the
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evolution of cooperation? Alternatively, can a third species interact with a
mutualist to prevent the evolution of cheating via some mechanism that we have
not identified? Investigators who conduct field studies of mutualisms certainly
convey a suspicion that ecological dynamics may provide key insights into the
maintenance of cooperation in ways that have not been anticipated (A Herre and O
Pellmyr, personal communication).
Origins of cooperation and the evolution of parameters
The maintenance of cooperation in our framework requires many conditions
that are treated as invariant in our mechanisms. For example, partner fidelity
feedback requires that partners are associated for an appropriate duration, possibly
across generations. Partner choice typically assumes an asymmetry in which the
chosen individual is forced to accept the consequences of being chosen or rejected;
there is an appropriate level of “control” for the persistence of cooperation,
whereby choice operates effectively but cannot enslave an individual. A broader
perspective for the evolution of cooperation would consider the evolution of these
parameters, ultimately addressing the origins of cooperation.
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CHAPTER II:
Evolution of conflict mediation between genomes
CHAPTER ABSTRACT
A central challenge in evolutionary biology is to explain the origins of novel levels
of biological complexity. Evolutionary transitions in complexity often require
cooperation among component individuals, however selection of individuals acts as
a counteracting force promoting conflict. Contemporary systems of cooperation
similarly provide avenues of conflict that can lead to the evolutionary decay of
cooperation, hence the evolutionary outcomes are often indeterminate and defy
prediction from first principles. Theory describes mechanisms of conflict
mediation, which limit selection among individuals and promote fitness variation at
the higher level of organization, however empirical work on this topic has been
scarce. Here, we experimentally investigate the evolution of cooperation and
conflict between two divergent bacteriophages (f1, IKe). We used an iterated
tripartite protocol: i) co-infection of the bacteriophages in Escherichia coli, ii)
enforcement of paired vertical transmission, iii) and production of infectious
bacteriophage progeny for the next cycle. The life cycle had episodes favoring
cooperation (i,ii), other episodes with conflict (iii), and the phages were propagated
to observe how the system would resolve. Remarkably, f1 and IKe evolved a
system in which opportunity for conflict nearly vanished: they evolved to co-
package their genomes into one protein-coat, ensuring co-transmission during the
infectious stage. Furthermore, IKe evolved to become dependent upon f1 by
evolving a minimal genome and the inability to infect cells independently. These
results parallel a variety conflict mediation mechanisms in nature -- evolution of
reduced genomes in symbionts, co-transmission of partners, and obligate
coexistence between cooperating species.
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INTRODUCTION
Organisms compete to procreate, and much of natural selection
consequently stems from the conflict ensuing from this competition, be it among
replicating molecules, unicellular organisms, or complex eukaryotes. However,
cooperation overcoming such conflict is a requirement for key features of life,
including (in theory) its origin (Eigen 1971; Eigen and Schuster 1977; Michod
1983). A rich body of theory and empirical work exists to explain the evolutionary
maintenance of cooperation (Hamilton 1964 a,b; Trivers 1971; Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981; Queller 1985; Bull and Rice 1991; Connor 1995; Sachs et al.
2004), but our understanding of the origins of cooperation and the specific
pathways that evolution can take to and from cooperation is relatively shallow.
Conflict mediation is the evolution of features in an individual or group that
minimize selection among component parts while promoting selection at the higher
(group) level (Michod 2003). Conflict is defined as divergent evolutionary
pressures favoring selfish or antagonistic outcomes. We specifically distinguish
forces of selection (i.e. cooperation, conflict) from their potential evolutionary
outcomes (i.e. benevolence, antagonism). Mediation of conflict is thought to be
critically important to major transitions in evolution. This is because cooperation
among once independent individuals is a prerequisite to their integration into a
higher level of biological complexity (Maynard-Smith and Szathmary 1995). For
example proto-replicator cooperation is a predicted condition for the origin of the
gene networks necessary for cellular life (Michod 1983; Szathmary 1986;
Szathmary and Demeter 1987), as well as the origin of chromosomes (Maynard-
Smith and Szathmary 1993, 1995). Similarly, cooperation between once
autonomous cells permitted the origins of eukaryotes (Margulis 1981) and
multicellularity (Michod 1997, 2003).
Conflict mediation may also be vital to contemporary systems of
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cooperation where avenues of conflict can lead to their breakdown. For example,
mitochondria are obligate symbionts of eukaryotic cells but can evolve to kill sons
because they are not transmitted through sons. In lichens, ancient symbioses
between algae and fungi, the partners can also evolve antagonism when routes to
selfishness exist (Richardson 1999). Correspondingly, algal symbionts of jellyfish
which are transmitted infectiously between hosts can evolve to selfishly exploit
those hosts (Sachs and Wilcox submitted). Proposed mechanisms of conflict
mediation are diverse, including specialization by individuals, partner fidelity
feedback (shared fate or coupled fitness between individuals, Bull and Rice 1991;
Sachs et al. 2004), and policing of uncooperative individuals to name a few (Frank
1995). However, there is little understanding of the genotypic or phenotypic details
inherent conflict mediation, nor whether common themes govern the evolutionary
pathways to cooperation.
Here, we experimentally investigated the evolution of cooperation and
conflict between two divergent filamentous bacteriophages (phages) of Escherichia
coli, f1 and IKe. Unlike most phages, f1 and IKe establish permanent non-lethal
infections in bacteria, and reproduce by extrusion through the cell wall without
lysis (Model & Russel 1988). Phenotypically, they act as highly transmissible
plasmids, however these phages experience antagonism when they co-infect cells
(Russel 1992). The experimental evolution protocol was a life history cycle of three
steps: encounter, growth and reproduction, iterated 50 times in series sequentially.
i) Encounter: coinfection of f1 and IKe in naïve E. coli, ii) Growth of the coinfected
cells for 18 hours, and iii) Reproduction: isolation of phage progeny produced after
step ii for the next cycle (Fig. 6; see methods). Each phage was engineered to
contain a distinct antibiotic resistance gene to enforce this protocol. By
manipulating vertical and infectious transmission of phages, our experimental
system creates a life history in which pairs of phage genomes are periodically
selected for cooperation (steps i and ii), interrupted by episodes in which each
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phage genome was potentially selected for selfish reproduction at the expense of its
partner (step iii: infectious transmission). The system provides pathways between
conflict and cooperation and thus can evolve in multiple directions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Bacteriophages and cell lines
The filamentous coliphages f1 and IKe are composed of circular, single-
stranded DNA encased in flexible protein capsids. These phages are known to
negatively interact with each other within cells: each suffers severe fitness losses
during co-infection relative to single infection (Russel 1992). This discord is likely
driven by competition for host resources, and via non-productive binding
interactions between inter-specific DNAs and gene products (Peeters et al. 1986,
1987; Russel 1992). The f1 genome is 6407 nucleotides (nt) (Gen Bank accession
#V00606; Beck and Zink 1981) and the IKe genome is 6883 nt (Gen Bank
accession #X02139; Peeters et. al. 1985). Capsid length is determined by genome
size, allowing easy genetic manipulations including insertion of non-phage DNA
(Messing 1979). While f1 and IKe share only 55% nucleotide identity, they contain
the same 10 genes in synteny and share features indicating common ancestry
(Peeters et. al. 1985; Model & Russel 1988). Infection by f1 requires hosts with the
F-episome (expressing the F pilus) while infection by IKe requires the IncN
episome (expressing the N3 pilus; Bradley 1979). Both f1 and IKe halt super-
infection by their own species through retraction of those particular pili (Dotto et
al. 1981; Model and Russel 1988; Messenger et al. 1999). Hence, each phage uses
different means to enter cells and conflict during cell entry is unlikely.
The ten genes of f1 are numbered I-X, and the IKe homologues are
numbered similarly. Genes III, VI, VII, VIII, and IX encode structural proteins:
VIII encodes the major coat protein, III and VI encode minor coat proteins at the
pilus attachment end of the phage and VII and IX are at the opposing end. Genes II
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and X regulate DNA replication (X is encoded in-frame within II). V is a single-
stranded DNA binding protein also involved in replication regulation, and genes I
and IV encode proteins that assist in phage assembly and export from the cell
(Model and Russel 1988; Russel 1993; Feng et al. 1999). Two intergenic regions
also exist with regulatory DNA rich in secondary structure.
Three E. coli K12 cell lines were employed (received from M. Russel).
Strain A527 contains the tetracycline resistant IncN conjugative plasmid encoding
N-pili, K19 is an HfrC strain that encodes F pili, and K1037 is both HfrC and
contains the IncN plasmid, expressing both N and F pili (see Russel 1992). Only
K1037 can be infected by both phages.
Genetic manipulations of phages
Each phage was engineered to include gene inserts encoding antibiotic
resistance. The Tn903 kanamycin resistance gene (Gen Bank accession #X06404;
Taylor and Rose 1988) was inserted into the IKe genome, and the Tn9
chloramphenicol resistance gene (Gen Bank accession #J01841; Alton and Vapnek
1979) was inserted into the f1 genome (received from M. Russel). Inserts were
cloned into the intergenic regions of f1 and IKe between genes II and IV (f1 insert
site 5614, IKe insert at site 0). Engineered phage were passaged individually prior
to the experiment so that the mutations we scored were unlikely to be
compensatory mutations to the insert DNA. We refer to these engineered and singly
passaged f1 and IKe as ‘ancestral’ genomes in this study, not to suggest that they
are wild-type.
Passaging protocol
i) Encounter (i.e. infection)—Cells were incubated in shaking water-baths
at 200 rpm, 37oC, and grown in standard LB medium (10gm/L NaCl, 10gm/L
Bacto-tryptone, 5gm/L yeast extract, 2µM CaCl2). Phage were added to 10 ml
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cultures at cell densities ≈2·108/ml, during logarithmic growth at low multiplicities
(MOI <0.1). Infection proceeded for sixteen minutes before kanamycin (37.5
µg/ml) and chloramphenicol (25.0 µg/ml) were added. We set antibiotic
concentrations at twice the empirically determined minimal inhibitory
concentration to minimize copy number selection between the phage genomes.
Phage used for the initial coinfection were derived from stocks of the individual
phages. Whereas subsequent infections used phage mixtures from the previous
cycle.
ii) Growth of coinfected cells—Once antibiotics were added, only
coinfected cells could grow (enforcing paired vertical transmission). Coinfected
cells grew for 18 hours in the original media.
iii) Reproduction of phage progeny—Cells were twice centrifuged and
washed with fresh, pre-warmed medium containing both antibiotics. After the
second suspension, the culture was grown for one hour to produce phage, at which
point the cells were pelleted and killed by a 20 minute exposure to 65oC. The phage
supernatant was diluted and used to infect naïve cells for the next passage. Only
phage could evolve under this protocol, since cells were completely replaced at the
beginning of each cycle. Coinfected cells and phage supernatant of every passage
were archived. Cells were stored in LB (25% Glycerol) at –80oC, and phage
supernatants were filter sterilized and stored at 4oC. This procedure was iterated for
fifty cycles.
Fitness measures
 i) Vertical transmission fitness—To assess the level of cooperation
(between phages and with the host) that existed during growth of coinfected cells,
populations of cells infected with evolved phages were competed with populations
of cells infected with ancestral phages. Competitions took place in one flask, with
one of the competing cell lines marked with nalidixic acid resistance. Competing
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cell lines were mixed at low concentrations in pre-warmed media with both
antibiotics present and grown for 18 hours. Relative frequency of marked and
unmarked cells was estimated before and after growth by replica plating. The
change in frequency of the cells coinfected with evolved phages was used to derive
relative fitness measures, with ancestors arbitrarily assigned a fitness of one. The
nalidixic resistant cells differed slightly (≈10%) in fitness from wild type k1037.
Consequently, assays were done reciprocally (ancestral versus evolved phages in
nalidixic resistant cells) to correct for fitness differences in the marked cell lines.
ii) Infectious transmission fitness—Fecundity of each of the phages was
estimated from the supernatant titer after the hour long phage production step.
Serially diluted supernatants were infected into k1037 cells at very low MOI
(<0.01) and plated separately on kanamycin and chloramphenicol to measure
densities of each of the phage types.
Sequencing and nomenclature
Both phage genomes were sequenced completely from time points before
and after selection with at minimum 2X coverage, and regions with mutations were
sequenced over multiple passages to estimate when the mutations ascended.
Sequences were obtained from PCR products of phage genomes from supernatant
phage populations and from clones (when results were ambiguous). Multiple peaks
on the sequence electropherogram (Seqman 3.6.0, DNASTAR Inc.) at one
nucleotide position were assumed to represent polymorphism, and fixation was
assumed once multiple peaks resolved to one. However, using consensus sequences
in this way roughly approximates mutant frequencies and fixation times (Badgett et
al. 2002). Nucleotide positions of mutations follow Gen Bank designations.
Protein coat packaging assays
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The frequency of cross-packaging (one genome packaged in the
heterologous coat) and co-packaging (both genomes packaged into one coat) were
measured because they had important consequences to evolution in this system.
The phage’s protein coat determines the type of pilus that it uses to infect cells. By
using different combinations of host pili (F, N3 only) and antibiotic resistance
selection, we could discern these packaging variants from the wild type phages (fig.
7). Cross-packaging rates were estimated as the proportion of all phage infected
cells (with one pilus type) that contained the heterologous genome. A proportion of
these phages had co-packaged genomes (i.e. also packaged their native genome).
Co-packaging rates were calculated in two ways: i) as the proportion of total
phages infecting a cell with one pilus type that were resistant to both antibiotics.
This was estimated by replica plating sub-samples of the above colonies on the
alternate antibiotic. For example, sub-samples of colonies that grew on kanamycin
in K19 cells (IKe genomes in f1 coats) were replica plated on chloramphenicol to
reveal the proportion of these phage infected cells that also contained the f1
genome. ii) Infections were done on k1037 cells (both pilus types) at very low
MOIs (<10-4 each phage type), and the proportion of phage containing both
genomes was estimated by the density of plated colonies that grew on both
antibiotics. Since these infections were done at such a low MOI, errors introduced
by coinfections should have been negligible.
RESULTS
Chronicle of f1 and IKe evolution
Over the course of the evolution the two phages evolved molecular changes
which allowed both f1 and IKe genomes to be packaged into the same protein coat,
thus ensuring their co-transmission during the infectious stage. Subsequently, IKe
evolved a minimal genome unable to infect cells independently. The evolution
occurred more or less in two steps. i) Initially IKe’s fecundity was feeble relative to
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f1 (≈2%), and at the outset the rarity of IKe may have favored evolution of co-
packaged genomes as a mechanism to ensure coinfection. The frequency of co-
packaged genomes (mostly in f1 coats) increased significantly from the ancestral
condition in which they were rare (see below). ii) IKe evolved a minimal genome,
dispensing all but three of its genes (≈ passage 41; fig. 8), and completely relied on
f1 for all coat proteins and morphogenetic processes. The substantial gene loss in
IKe required it to be coinfected with f1 to produce infectious particles. The
evolution co-packaging rate continued to increase and after IKe minimization all
genomes were packaged in f1 coats. Both the genome minimization in IKe, and the
evolution of co-packaging apparently enhanced overall fitness benefit to both
phages (see below).
Co-packaging and cross-packaging evolution
i) Co-packaging. The ancestral genomes were rarely co-packaged, the
initial rate was 0.1% (±0.02%). By passage 20 co-packaging had evolved a twenty-
fold increase to 2.1% (±0.01%) with >99.9% of these in f1 coats. At the end of the
evolution the co-packaging rate reached 15% (±1.2%), a ≈150 fold increase from
the ancestral condition (fig. 9).
ii) Cross-packaging. Initially both genomes were cross-packaged at
relatively low rates: f1 = 2.1% (±01.2%), IKe = 4.5% (±03.1%). Cross-packaging
rate evolved in both phages such that each genome increasingly became packaged
in f1 coats (fig. 9). Whereas IKe experienced a dramatic increase in cross-
packaging by passage twenty to 78.3% (±12.5%), in the same period the proportion
of f1 genomes in IKe coats rate decreased to 0.05% (±0.002%). Thereafter, IKe’s
cross-packaging rate continued to increase reaching 99.2% (±0.007%) by passage
40, whereas f1 did not change significantly in this interval. After the full genome of
IKe went extinct (≈passage 43) all genomes of both phages were packaged in f1
coats. (see fig. 9).
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Fitness evolution
i) Vertical transmission fitness. Fitness increased to 2.9 (±0.9) by passage
38 and to 8.6 (±3.0) by 50 (Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric 1-way test, P = 0.01; fig.
10). We used 38 as an intermediate point because it preceded the major genome
reduction in IKe, hence we separately estimated the fitness effects of genetic
change occurring before and after the genome reduction. Fitness increased ≈300%
during each of these periods.
ii) Infectious transmission fitness. Fitness (titer of phages in supernatants)
increased significantly in both phages: f1 titer increased from the ancestral
≈2.6•107/ml to ≈1.4•109/ml at passage 50 (ANOVA, p = 0.016), and IKe increased
its titer from initial ≈6.2•105/ml to ≈1.8•109/ml at passage 50 (ANOVA, p < 0.001;
fig. 11). Baseline rates of infectious fitness, in which the titer of each of the
ancestral phages was measured unaccompanied, were consistent with significant,
asymmetric costs to co-infection: f1 ≈ 1.3•108/ml, IKe ≈ 1.4•108/ml. Thus, initial
co-infection (passage 1) reduced phage output ≈5x in f1, and ≈225x in IKe
compared to these baselines However, these single infections necessarily required




Over the course of the evolution the f1 genome accrued eight point
mutations while IKe had nine point mutations (including two which reverted) and
two large deletions (tables 2, 3). Each phage accrued three missense mutations.
Other point mutations occurred at three non-coding loci in IKe and two of these
affected DNA secondary structure. Five point mutations occurred in f1 non-coding
DNA, four of which affected DNA secondary structure. We classify mutations into
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putative functional classes: i) reduction of cost to host, ii) packaging, iii) anti-
interference and reproduction control, and iv) compensatory to IKe minimization.
i) Reduction of cost to host. Two deletions occurred in IKe. These likely
minimized costs to the host and thus enhanced fitness during vertical transmission
(see table 3, fig. 10). The first, IKe (insert) sites 411-523, emerged in passage 12
and removed 212 nt of non-coding insert DNA between the kanamycin resistance
gene and IKe II. The major deletion, IKe sites 1442-5983 removed 4541nt (all
genes but II, X and Kn insert) and emerged in passage 41, though PCR evidence
suggests that it was present in very low concentrations in passage 40. This deletion
quickly spread to fixation (see fig. 8). While the first mutation streamlined the IKe
genome by ≈2.5%, the larger removed ≈57% of the genome. We predict that
savings in phage metabolism drove the three-fold increase in coinfected cell fitness
which was temporally correlated with the larger deletion.
ii) Packaging. most co-packaging and cross-packaging evolution occurred
in the first 20 passages (see fig. 9). Hence, we focus on the five mutations that fixed
(or ascended) in this period. These include three point mutations in f1: f1 (insert)
site 186, in non-coding DNA, f1 site 5674, in the minus-strand origin, and f1 site
957, a missense mutation in gene V. The two mutations in IKe included the 212 nt
deletion (above), and a missense point mutation in gene III, IKe site 2173, which
had ascended at passage 20, but without evidence of fixation until 30.
Packaging evolution in this period was likely driven by single missence
mutations f1 gene V and IKe gene III. Gene V encodes the ssDNA binding protein
which coats genomes and readies them for morphogenesis and export (Russel
1992), and thus could evolve to promote packaging of the heterologous genome.
Gene III encodes a minor coat protein residing at the end of the phage where
packaging is terminated, and mutations in this gene have been shown to promote
packaging of multiple genomes (Lopez and Webster 1983; Model and Russel
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1988). The three other mutations in this interval were non-coding, and unlikely
affect packaging evolution (see tables 2,3). Two clustered missense mutations,
which occurred in the overlapping genes II and X in this period, are discussed
below.
iii) Anti-interference and reproduction control. Both phages initially
experienced significant fitness costs to co-infection under our measures. Infectious
transmission fitness was lower during initial co-infection than the individual
(baseline) measures of infectious fitness. Under different protocols Russel (1992)
also detected interference between f1 and IKe during co-infection with >50 fold
depression of phage production in both f1 and IKe. Infectious transmission fitness
increased during the evolution and reached levels that were significantly above
baseline (see fig. 11). Thus, evolution minimized the costs of co-infection. Most of
the change in infectious fitness occurred before passage 20 for f1 and passage 40
for IKe, and we concentrate on the mutations occurring in this period. In f1 three
point mutations, all discussed above, fixed in this period: f1 insert site 186, and f1
sites 5674 and 957. In IKe five changes fixed, IKe insert site 411 and IKe site 2173,
both discussed above, as well as three clustered mutations in the non-coding minus-
strand origin, IKe sites 6377, 6379 and 6382. The two clustered missense mutations
in the overlapping genes II and X (IKe sites 1116 and 1156) appeared to interact
over this period.
The changes in the minus-strand origins of both phages are interesting,
especially since these they occurred in apparently homologous stem and loop
structures in both genomes. The minus strand origin is a non-coding region of
defined secondary structure in the large intergenic region between II and IV (Beck
and Zink 1981; Peeters et al. 1985), which serves as a double-stranded attachment
point for the cell’s RNA polymerase and initiates complementation of the single-
stranded phage DNA upon its initial entry to the cell. However, these DNA
structures act in cis, so it is unclear how they could be involved in phage
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competition for host resources or in non-productive binding. Non-productive
binding is much more likely to be minimized by the mutations in protein coding
regions that act in trans such as the mutants IKe sites 1116 and 1156 that overlap
IKe X and II (X is encoded in-phase within II). These mutants may ameliorate
cross-genome termination, or other non-productive binding (Peeters et al. 1986,
1987), and are also implicated in replication control, as X acts as a negative
regulator of II and catalyzes rolling-circle replication of the phage genome (Model
and Russel 1988). Perplexingly, neither of these mutations ever fixed in the
experiment. The two loci appear to alternate nucleotide states with each other
(when one is predominately g the other is c and vice versa), so any fitness
advantages to these mutations may be frequency dependent.
iv) Compensatory to IKe minimization. Over one third (seven) of the
mutations that occurred in both phages arose immediately after the major genome
reduction of IKe (see tables 2,3). These mutations included two missense mutations
in f1 genes I and VI (f1 sites 4072 and 2988) and non-coding mutations in the
morphogenetic signal of f1 (f1 sites 5521 and 5529), the minus-strand origin of IKe
(IKe sites 6377 and 6379) and the intergenic region of IKe (IKe site 6681). We
posit that this burst of mutations was driven by IKe genome minimization, since at
no other point in the experiment are so many mutations clustered, however we can
offer no more than speculation.
DISCUSSION
Indeterminacy in evolution and genetic details
The design attempted to mimic natural systems of cooperation with
elements of conflict, whereby the evolutionary outcome was indeterminate. This
study is therefore unusual among studies of experimental evolution, since there is a
clear anticipated phenotypic outcome in most studies. Here, with selection for
cooperation in some stages and routes to conflict in others, theory offered no
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predictions of whether the system would resolve to increased antagonism,
benevolence or some combination thereof.
The growth period of co-infected cells favored cooperation between the two
phages, and if the entire life cycle was restricted to this vertical transmission phase,
the predicted outcome is enhanced cooperation (e.g., Bull et al. 1991). The
inclusion of a reproductive phase to the life cycle adds a dimension of conflict, and
the direction of evolution then becomes unpredictable, depending on system
biology. The reproductive phase favors high progeny output from each phage in the
cell, independently of its partner, but mutations benefiting the reproductive phase
may harm the growth phase (or vice versa) and evolve according to the balance of
those opposing effects. If a mutant f1 arose that increased its progeny by co-opting
the reproduction of its Ike partner, the mutant f1 would spread even if it ultimately
caused the loss of Ike and extinction of the population (by analogy with selection
for sex chromosome meiotic drive, Hamilton 1967). However, if the mutant f1 had
the pleiotropic effect of failing to maintain its Ike partner in the cell during the
growth phase, the mutant would die before it had an opportunity to produce
progeny. Thus, the genetic details must be specified before the outcome can be
predicted.
When our design is coupled with an understanding of f1 and Ike biology,
the evolution of increased co-packaging is seen as a likely outcome. To appreciate
this, consider f1 progeny (in f1 coats, hence which infect through the F pilus), some
as “single” particles containing just f1 genomes, and others as “double” particles
containing an f1 and Ike genome. If the probability of encountering and infecting a
cell is P, and the fraction of those cells that will independently be infected by Ike is
QIke, the success of a single particle is PQIke. For comparison, the success of a
double-particle is P. Thus, a double particle is 1/Q times more likely to succeed
than a single particle.
If Q is small, there is strong selection for co-packaging, even though there is
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a likely tradeoff between double-particle and single-particle production. This result
is simply that a double particle has a much higher probability of success than a
single particle. The same conclusion applies to f1 and Ike, but an important
difference is that Qf1 may be different than QIke. Thus, the system may be more
predisposed to evolve co-packaging by Ike than by f1, or vice versa, but as long as
Q is small for both, both phages will benefit from co-packaging, regardless of
which coat surrounds them. The passaging was conducted so that Q for the most
abundant phage in the supernatant was 0.1 – 0.01 (data not shown). In the early
passages, f1 dominated the supernatant, and Ike was much rarer (Fig. 4), so the
system should have been most predisposed to evolve co-packaging of Ike by f1,
which is what evolved.
Conflict mediation by the evolution of co-packaging
The two phages evolved an elegant system in which the opportunity for
conflict between them was greatly minimized. Conflict mediation was achieved
principally via molecular changes allowing both phage genomes to be packaged
into the same protein coat, minimizing conflict during the phase of infectious
transmission. During this step each phage is selected for maximal reproduction at
the potential expense of the other. However, by packaging both genomes together
their fitness interests become coupled and conflict reduces. Coupling of fitness
interests is a common factor promoting cooperation between individuals, also
known as partner fidelity feedback (Bull and Rice 1991; Sachs et al. 2004). Partner
fidelity feedback stabilizes cooperation between longstanding neighbors (Nowak
and May 1992; Doebeli and Knowlton 1998), in vertically transmitted symbionts
and organelles (Fine 1975; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Bull and Rice 1991), and
any case where repeated or long-term interactions couple fitness between
interactants (Frank 1994; Sachs et al. 2004). Experimental work has shown the
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efficacy of partner fidelity feedback (via vertical transmission) in selecting for
benevolence (Bull et al. 1991; Bull and Molineux 1992; Messenger et al. 1999).
While the evolution of co-packaging reduced conflict between f1 and IKe it
was probably not favored for this reason. As our model above shows, the initial
rarity of IKe relative to f1 strongly favored packaging of both genomes into f1
coats, simply as a mechanism ensuring survival to the next stage in the life history.
It is illuminating that the mechanism of conflict mediation (co-packaging) initially
evolved for a different reason. This highlights the importance of the genetic details
of a system in deciding its trajectory towards cooperation or conflict.
The evolution of co-packaging apparently provided an overall benefit for
both phages. All our measures of phenotypic change were consistent with the
evolution of cooperation between IKe and f1. Fitness during vertical transmission
increased almost nine-fold over the experiment (see fig. 10), and both phages
enjoyed significantly increased fitness during infectious transmission as well; (see
fig. 11). Assays of phage genome packaging revealed the evolution of a symbiotic
relationship between the phages: co-packaging of genomes evolved from an initial
rare event to where a substantial proportion of phages packaged both genomes (see
fig. 9).
Genome minimization and evolution of cross-packaging
The genome minimization in IKe potentially provided an overall benefit for
both phages, probably because it reduced costs to the host as well as minimized
competition and interference between the two phages. However, genome
minimization in IKe was necessarily preceded by the evolution of cross-packaging
in f1 coats, and the emergence and fixation of cross-packaging by IKe could be
construed as the evolution of parasitism. Whereas co-packaging is a clear (though
unexpected) route to cooperation in this system, cross-packaging offers a pathway
to conflict. Cross-packaging of genomes allows one partner to selfishly sequester
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key resources from its partner (coat proteins and morphogenetic proteins) at the
potential cost to the other.
If cross packaging and genome minimization by IKe represent selfish
evolution, this was not born out by the fitness data: f1 enjoyed increased fitness
throughout most of the experiment, though appeared to level off between passages
40 and 50. However, the details of the molecular evolution offer the clearest
evidence against a parasitic IKe model: we propose that the f1 gene V mutation
drove the cross-packaging, whereas IKe was mainly passive. Under our model the
gene V mutation in f1 is jointly responsible for the increase of cross-packaging rate
in IKe and the decrease in f1. The IKe gene V protein binds single stranded
genomes in preparation for packaging (Salstrom and Pratt 1971; Model and Russel
1988), and also acts as a translational repressor of II: production of pV promotes
the shift from replication of double-stranded genomes to single-stranded genomes
ready for packaging (Michel and Zinder 1989a). Under our model the f1 gene V
mutation drives cross-binding of the f1 gene V protein (f1pV) to IKe genomes, and
when f1pV is later exchanged for the proteins of the coat (Russel 1992) the f1pV
bound genomes are preferentially packaged in f1 coats.
This conjecture is based on two main assumptions, that f1pV is genome
specific in f1-IKe co-infections and that the type of pV bound on a genome leads
causes transfer of the same type of coat proteins onto that genome. There is some
support for pV specificity in co-infections: while V can be successfully
interchanged between f1 and IKe genomes (Russel 1992), Michel and Zinder
(1989b) showed specific binding of V to the gene II RNA-operator (which differ
between f1 and IKe), and suggest that this may act as a nucleation site for binding
of pV to single-stranded genomes.
Parallels to natural systems
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The evolution of cooperation between f1 and IKe in our experiment shares
key features with a variety of natural systems in which conflict mediation has
evolved. Three main parallels are drawn: evolution of reduced genomes, obligate
dependence in symbionts and organelles and the evolution of co-transmission of
symbiotic partners.
i) Reduced genomes
Reduced genomes are a common feature in vertically transmitted
symbionts. This phenomenon is particularly well demonstrated in bacteria that form
ancient associations with eukaryotic cells (Palmer 1997; Moran and Wernegreen
2000) including organelles. Genome reduction can result from selection for
streamlining, as we predict drove genome reduction in IKe, or via drift.
Streamlining may evolve cooperatively, to minimize costs to hosts with which the
symbiont shares fitness interests (Fine 1975; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Sachs et
al. 2004) or may directly benefit the symbiont by removing metabolic pathways
which are redundant with the host (Moran and Wernegreen 2000). Drift is also
clearly implicated in the minimization of such ‘resident’ genomes, as they are
exposed to repeated bottlenecks and replication in small populations (Andersson
and Kurland 1998). However, as the genome reduction in IKe was associated with
a three-fold fitness gain in coinfected cell fitness (see fig. 10), it was unlikely to be
a drift process.
ii) Obligate coexistence
Obligate coexistence in symbionts may derive from such genome
streamlining. Loss of genes in symbionts whose function are shared with the host
may accumulate until independent existence becomes impossible. Gene loss in IKe
rendered it unable to independently produce infectious progeny, as it lost all
packaging and morphogenetic functions. IKe, however, retained the ability to be
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vertically transmitted on its own, since it contained genes II, X and its replication
origins which allow it to undergo replication in a plasmid-like state. Filamentous
phage have been shown to evolve loss of infectiousness under strict vertical
transmission (Bull et al. 1991; Bull and Molineux 1992), though without genomic
data, it is unclear if these cases were due to streamlining or drift.
iii) Co-transmission of symbiotic partners
Co-transmission evolved between f1 and IKe in the form of co-packaged
genomes. Partner fidelity feedback (Bull and Rice 1991; Sachs et al. 2004) existed
during the vertical transmission portion of our protocol and represents selection for
cooperation. Whereas during infectious transmission f1 and IKe could spread
separately, and without partner fidelity feedback selfish interests were promoted.
However, evolutionary enhancement of partner fidelity (Bull and Rice 1991; Sachs
et al. 2004) was a result of the evolution of co-packaging, and this finds parallels in
many cooperative symbioses.
The extreme case of partner fidelity is vertical transmission, for example
where symbionts are locked within a host lineage, and cooperation is favored (Fine
1975; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). However symbiotic partners are not always
locked together as such and diverse mechanisms have evolved whereby individuals
enhance their chance of remaining with a current partner. A parallel example from
an experimental system is the evolution of host-genome integration in vertically
transmitted phage (Bull and Molineux 1992). Other examples include the evolution
of adhesive polymers (Rainey and Rainey 2003) and socially-dependent swarming
(Velicer and Yu 2003) in social bacteria. In these two cases phenotypes evolved
which enhanced adhesiveness between individuals, thus coupling their fates.
Enhancement of partner fidelity feedback has also evolved between species.
Examples include vegetative and sexual co-propagation in lichens (Sanders and
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Lücking 2002) and semi-closed transmission of algal symbionts in symbiotic
jellyfish (Montgomery and Kremer 1995).
Similarly f1 and IKe, forced to undergo phases of mixing (horizontal
transmission), evolved co-packaging and enhanced co-transmission (partner fidelity
feedback) of cooperating partners. Theory predicts that such adaptations enhancing
partner fidelity feedback are more likely to evolve in hosts, while symbionts are
favored to disperse out of their host lineage, and thus diminish partner fidelity
(Frank 1996). However, under Frank’s model symbiont dispersal becomes
disfavored if the likelihood of successfully colonizing a new host is relatively
small. Under the early conditions of our experiment this may have been the case.
Initially IKe had extremely low fitness: most cells (>97%) were only infected with
f1 when both antibiotics were added and thus were evolutionary dead ends. The
mutations in f1 gene V and IKe gene III apparently enhanced co-packaging rates
and thus increased partner fidelity between the phages. However this enhancement
of partner fidelity (and thus cooperation) is completely explained via the selfish
benefit of assured coinfection.
Thus, mechanisms that enhance partner fidelity have evolved under diverse
settings in nature, and emerged relatively quickly under our design. It has been
suggested that conflict mediation is a major hurdle to be overcome in the major
transitions of evolution (Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995) however the
generality of mechanisms that mediate conflict between selfish partners may render
this hurdle minimal. Perhaps such evolutionary transitions, where individuals
become integrated into a larger whole (Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995) are
more limited by physiological, genetic or mechanistic constraints than conflict
between component parts. It would be illuminating to attempt another experiment
like the present one in which co-packaging of genomes was impossible, and see if
other mechanisms emerged which promoted partner fidelity feedback.
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Partner fidelity feedback is a general force which by which conflict is
mediated between those individuals (Bull and Rice 1991; Sachs et al. 2004). While
extrinsic forces (i.e. viscous environments) can augment repeated interactions
between partners, partner fidelity is limited by the strength of those forces and
other mechanisms (discussed above) may evolve by which to enhance partner
fidelity. The evolutionary origin of cooperation may work in such a fashion, where
extrinsic forces initially allow fitness interests between partners to be aligned, and
further cooperation is favored only when intrinsic mechanisms that enhance partner
fidelity evolve. However, we do not suggest that selection necessarily favors the
evolutionary enhancement of partner fidelity, only that further evolution of
cooperation may be limited without such enhancement.
Conclusion
This experiment provides the first empirical analysis of the genotypic and
phenotypic details inherent to the evolution origin of cooperation. The origin of
cooperation between f1 and IKe, defined by overall increased fitness in both
players, was characterized by the evolution of co-transmission of partners and a
reduced genome driving obligate coexistence (in IKe). While further study would
be necessary to establish the generality of these features, convergent evolution of
enhanced partner fidelity in diverse natural systems of cooperation is suggestive its
significance. These data also provide empirical data to test theory on the
evolutionary origins of cooperation. Our experiment matches many characteristics
of the stochastic corrector model for the evolutionary origin of replicator
cooperation (Szathmary and Demeter 1987). The similarity of our results to the
model’s predictions lend credence to the assumptions of this model, and provide




 Cheating in the Cnidarian symbiont Symbiodinium microadriaticum
CHAPTER ABSTRACT
Symbioses with horizontal transmission are ubiquitous, however their
evolutionary maintenance remains obscure. Theory predicts exploitation of the host
by horizontally transmitted symbionts, yet they are commonly beneficial. We
experimentally altered algal symbiont transmission between jellyfish hosts to
examine the evolution of cheating in a horizontally transmitted mutualism. Our
experiments uncovered cheater algal symbionts. Cheaters emerged under repeated
horizontal transmission, significantly lowering host fitness. However, transmission
of cheaters appears to be limited by the severe harm they cause their hosts. Our
results demonstrate the dynamic nature of this infectious symbiosis, and illuminate
predictions about the evolution of bleaching in algal hosts.
INTRODUCTION
Understanding the stability of cooperation against cheating remains a
critical problem in evolutionary biology (Hardin 1968; Axelrod and Hamilton
1981; Bull and Rice 1991; Frank 1994, 1996a,b; Sachs et al. 2004). Symbioses,
intimate interactions between species, provide some paradoxical examples of
mutual aid (Savage 1977; Sprent et al. 1987; Trench 1993; Ruby 1996). For
symbionts which offer costly benefits to hosts, we must explain what prevents them
from cheating and thus gaining reproductive advantage over cooperating
(beneficial) symbionts (Hardin 1968; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Bull and Rice
1991; Frank 1994, 1996a,b, Sachs et al. 2004). Cheating occurs when a symbiont
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receives benefits from its host with little or no reciprocation (Soberon and Martinez
1985; Bronstein 2003): the symbiont enjoys fitness benefits at a cost to the host’s
fitness (Sachs et al. 2004). Optimal virulence theory, developed to study pathogen
evolution, predicts cooperation in symbionts that are transmitted from host parent
to offspring (vertical transmission) because symbionts are locked within a host
lineage, leaving little opportunity for conflict (Fine 1975; Axelrod and Hamilton
1981; Bull and Rice 1991; Bull 1994; Frank 1994). However, horizontal
transmission, in which symbionts are acquired by hosts from the environment,
decouples symbiont fitness interests from the host, allowing cheaters to spread
(Fine 1975; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Ewald 1983; Bull and Rice 1991; Bull
1994; Frank 1994, 1996a,b; Sachs et al. 2004). Horizontal transmission also
promotes co-infection by unrelated symbionts that compete for host resources,
potentially to the detriment of the host (Frank 1994, 1996a,b). Paradoxically,
horizontally transmitted mutualists are common and diverse in nature. They include
algal symbionts in a wide array of marine invertebrates (Trench 1993), mammalian
gut-symbionts (Savage 1977), nitrogen-fixing rhizobia in legumes (Sprent 1987),
and bioluminescent bacteria in fish and squids (Ruby 1996). While some work
suggests that cheating may be common in cooperative systems (Soberon and
Martinez 1985; Bronstein 2003), the data in support of symbiotic cheating has been
meager. Demonstrating cheating requires showing that symbionts enjoy fitness
benefits at a fitness cost to the host, as opposed to the presence of ineffective
symbionts or a poorly matched host-symbiont combinations in which both
symbiont and host potentially suffer lowered fitness.
THE EXPERIMENT
Here, we determine the effect of altering transmission mode on symbiont
cheating in a horizontally transmitted algal symbiont of the upside-down jellyfish
(Cassiopea xamachana). The dinoflagellate algae provide their marine hosts
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including corals hydras, and jellyfish with photosynthates (Balderston and Claus
1969), in exchange for nitrogen and inorganic nutrients (Muscatine 1990). Upside-
down jellyfish are born symbiont-free, disperse from their mother as planula larvae,
and acquire algae from the environment once they have reached the sessile polyp
stage (Fig. 12). The asexual polyps can reproduce via clonal budding and infected
polyps transmit algae to polyp offspring via vertical transmission. Once infected,
polyps undergo metamorphosis to the medusa stage. Most Cnidarian hosts acquire
symbiotic algae infectiously (Fadlallah 1983; Babcock and Heyward 1986;
Harrison and Wallace 1990) and their symbionts may thus be selected for host
exploitation (Fine 1975; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Ewald 1983; Bull and Rice
1991; Bull 1994; Frank 1994, 1996a,b). While such exploitation is predicted on
theoretical grounds, symbiont cheating has been little investigated in marine
symbioses.
We gathered algae from wild jellyfish medusae, infected them into a clone
of symbiont-free polyps, and experimentally manipulated transmission mode. In
one treatment, buds produced by infected, isoclonal polyps were used as offspring
for new host generations, thus enforcing vertical transmission. In the other
treatment, horizontal transmission was enforced by infecting a new generation of
uninfected host polyps (from the same isoclonal line) with algae expelled from the
previous generation of hosts. Treatments were each replicated threefold. Two
rounds of experimental transmission followed initial infection, with seven weeks
between transmission rounds (Fig. 13). To determine the effects of the treatments
we estimated the fitness of hosts and symbionts after experimental selection.
During selection algal density within a polyp may have diverged between
treatments. To control for this during our fitness assays, we created new
populations of infected polyps by: 1) extracting the selected algae from
experimental polyps, 2) separately exposing uninfected isoclonal polyps to equal
densities of the evolved algae from each treatment, and 3) waiting 90 days to allow
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symbionts to fully populate hosts. Host fitness was estimated by counting buds
released from polyps (asexual reproduction) and measuring growth rate of polyps
(a predictor of time to maturation) over two week periods. Symbiont fitness was
estimated by measuring the rate that algae were expelled from hosts (a measure of
infectiousness), the density of algae within the host (a measure of symbiont
effectiveness), as well as mitotic index (proportion of algal cells undergoing
cytokinesis within the host). To assess whether fitness effects of experimental
selection generalized across host genotypes, we also infected the evolved algae into
three novel host genotypes.
Cheaters could potentially exist in the initial pool of algae or emerge over
the course of the experiment. We assume a genetically diverse initial pool of algae
as they were sampled over a wide range. Opportunity for generation of novel
mutants during the experiment was minimal: based on the fastest doubling-time
reports of 1.4 - 6 days for related algae within-host, there were maximally 60 - 257
doublings during the experiment (Hansen and Nielsen 1997; Fitt 2000).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Host and symbiont collection
Hosts for experimental evolution originated from a planula larva of a female
jellyfish collected at Keys Marine Lab, Long Key (N 24o 49’, W 80o 49’) that was
grown up to a clone of symbiont-free polyps in the lab. Alternate hosts for re-
infection experiments were half-sibling groups of polyps from a single mother, and
unknown father(s), gathered at Grassy Key (N 24o 45’, W 80o 59’), Upper-
Matecumbe Key (N 24o 54’, W 80o 38’) and Key Largo (N 25o 05’, W 80o 27’).
Host planulae were rinsed of maternal tissue and raised into algae-free polyps.
Algae were collected from 2 medusae (one large, one small) at each of ten sites
along a 120 mile transect ranging from Key Largo in the northeast (N 25o 05’, W
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80o 27’) to Geiger key in the southwest (N 24o 35’, W 81o 39’). Previous work
confirmed that multiple strains of one species, S. microadriaticum infects C.
xamachana in the sampled range (Wilcox, personal communication).
Infection and experimental selection
An equal density mix of algal isolates was added to 180 isoclonal polyps in
artificial sea water (ASW), at a final concentration of 103 algae/ml. Infection lasted
48 hours before the polyps were divided into 6 flasks: 2 treatment lines – horizontal
and vertical transmission, 3 replicates per line, 30 polyps per replicate. All infected
polyps were fed tri-weekly to repletion on Artemia salina nauplii, and incubated at
21oC on a 12:12 hour light-dark cycle. Cassiopea polyps will not undergo
metamorphosis to the medusa stage at 21oC, but will continue to produce asexual
buds. ASW was changed each feeding, and flasks replaced weekly to minimize free
algae. In the vertical treatment, polyp buds were collected in separate flasks. In the
horizontal treatment, buds were discarded. Polyp lines were maintained until algal
expulsion was detected (free swimming Symbiodinium could be seen in the culture
water – seven weeks in all cases). Transmission of symbionts to the next generation
of hosts was then initiated. In the vertical treatment, new lines were established
using 30 randomly chosen polyps arising from buds previously saved. These polyps
inherited their algal symbionts from the parent polyp, so symbiont transmission
was strictly vertical. New polyps were then placed in a clean flask with fresh ASW
and maintained as previously described. In the horizontal treatment, the next
generation of hosts were to acquire their symbionts from environmental sources.
Therefore, for each line the previous generation of polyps were placed in clean
flasks containing filtered ASW. These flasks were placed in the incubator and left
undisturbed for 48 hours. Infected polyps were then removed from the flasks, while
the ASW that contained expelled algae was retained. Into this water were placed 30
uninfected polyps (from the original isoclonal polyp line). The new polyps were
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allowed to acquire algae from the water for 48 hours before a normal feeding and
water change. The polyp lines were then maintained as previously described. After
two rounds of transmission, within-host algal densities between treatments may
have diverged. Therefore, prior to estimating fitness we created another host
generation in which all lines were exposed to equal densities of algae. For each
line, evolved algae were extracted from hosts by grinding. The density of algae
within the resulting slurry was estimated and new host lines created by adding
equal densities of algae to flasks containing 30 uninfected polyps from the original
isoclonal line. In parallel, the three alternate hosts were also infected. After 90 days
of infection, the fitness of hosts and symbionts were estimated.
Fitness estimation.
Two types of fitness assays were performed on the host and three on the symbiont.
Host fitness was estimated with budding rate and growth rate. From each replicate
flask 12 polyps were randomly chosen and separated into 6-well culture dishes with
5 ml of ASW. The diameter of each polyp was measured using a drawing tube
mounted to a dissecting microscope and tracing the polyp with a computer linked
drawing board (Wacom TM). Polyps were monitored for two weeks during which
released buds were counted and growth assessed. Growth was measured as change
in polyp diameter, and units were transformed to mg protein biomass using a curve
standardized to uninfected polyps: mg protein = 0.78Log10((Diameter/103)+1)).
Algal fitness was estimated using expulsion rate of algae from the host, density
within the host and mitotic index. After host fitness assays polyps were separated
into microfuge tubes with 1 ml of ASW, returned to the incubator for 48 hours,
then removed. The tube was then centrifuged to pellet expelled algae, and the pellet
was re-suspended in 50 µl ASW for manual counting of algae on a hemacytometer.
All polyps were then frozen and stored at –20oC for the remaining analyses.
Density within the host was estimated by counting algae from whole ground hosts
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(re-suspended in 100 µl of ASW) and dividing by host biomass. Finally, a squash
preparation from each polyp was used to estimate mitotic rate of the algae by
estimating the proportion of algal cells with division plates (Wilkerson et al. 1983).
All polyps were frozen in late morning (approximately 10-11am), to minimize
diurnal variation in mitotic index measures.
RESULTS
As predicted by theory (Fine 1975; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Bull and
Rice 1991; Frank 1994, 1996a,b; Sachs et al. 2004), experimental enforcement of
horizontal transmission selected for cheating symbionts. Algae from the horizontal
treatment had significantly higher division rates within their hosts (ANOVA, P =
0.003, N = 51), attained higher density within hosts (ANOVA, P = 0.03, N = 51),
and had significantly higher expulsion rates (with host biomass as a covariate) from
their hosts (ANCOVA, P < 0.05, N = 52), while causing reductions in host growth
(ANOVA, P < 0.001, N = 52) and budding (ANOVA, P < 0.001, N = 52: Fig. 14)
compared to the vertical treatment. Under the horizontal treatment 30% of hosts
shrunk by 10% or more in size and only 35% grew more than 10%. In contrast, in
the vertical treatment only 4% shrunk more than 10% while 88% grew greater than
10%. Treatment effects on host growth were consistent even in different host
genotypes (Fig. 15): evolved algae that were infected into hosts from three other
locales had similar treatment effects on host growth (full factorial ANOVA, P <
0.001, N = 18).
DISCUSSION
Although cheater algae are present (or evolved quickly) in natural isolates,
the fitness costs that they impose upon hosts may ultimately hinder their spread.
Two pieces of evidence suggest a trade-off exists between a symbiont’s virulence
(harm caused to host: Bull 1994) and its own reproduction. First, there is a strong
67
negative correlation between within-host algal division rate (mitotic index) and
host growth (R2= 0.834, P = 0.011); evidence that fast growing symbionts stunt
their host’s growth. Second, while algal expulsion rate per unit of host biomass was
significantly higher in the horizontal treatment, total expulsion did not differ
between treatments (ANOVA, P = 0.39, N = 52). This results from a positive
correlation between host size and algal expulsion rate (R2 = 0.34, P < 0.001) and
the smaller size (lower growth rate) of hosts infected with horizontally propagated
algae. Thus, fast symbiont division within hosts caused growth deficits in their
hosts, and small hosts expelled fewer algae overall. Just as optimal virulence is
predicted to be driven by such trade-offs in pathogens (Fine 1974; Ewald 1983;
Bull 1994) evolution of symbiont cheating may be limited by a trade-off against the
symbiont’s spread to new hosts.
Symbiont cheating may be prevalent in symbioses with horizontal
transmission (Savage 1977; Sprent et al. 1987; Trench 1993; Ruby 1996).
However, sufficient evidence for cheating has been scarce even in well studied
systems. This stems in part from the difficulty in estimating symbiont fitness. For
example, many plants benefit from infection with bacterial or fungal root
symbionts that exchange N (Rhizobia) or P (mycorrhiza) with plants respectively.
Cheating may be rampant in these symbionts: ‘ineffective’ strains delivering little
or none of the above nutrients to plants are well characterized (Singleton and
Stockinger 1983; Smith 1996). However, data demonstrating that these symbionts
enjoy clear fitness benefits while reducing host fitness has been lacking. These data
would distinguish exploitative symbionts from ones that are poorly matched with a
specific host, offer other benefits to hosts, or offer condition-dependent benefits.
Our results may also have implications for understanding the evolution of
coral bleaching. Bleaching, best known in corals, has received widespread interest
in biology, and is an important factor damaging fragile ecosystems (Buddemeier
and Fautin 1993; Baker 2001; Douglas 2003). Bleaching is a partial to total loss of
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algae as a generalized stress response to environmental insult (Cook 1990), and
affects corals, jellyfish, anemones, clams and sponges (Douglas 2003). An adaptive
hypothesis has been proposed for bleaching: host and/or symbiont benefit from
separation and forming novel combinations of partners under conditions of rapid
environmental change (Buddemeier and Fautin 1993). Experiments on corals have
provided evidence consistent with host benefit to re-sampling symbionts (Baker
2001). Our results question this benefit. Repeated shuffling of algae in our
horizontal treatment allowed hosts to sample the symbiont population, however
these hosts suffered reduced growth and budding. A tacit assumption to some
adaptive bleaching models is that hosts can control symbiont infection or expulsion
(Baker 2001). However, in our experiment exploitative algae grew to higher
densities within their hosts and this argues against host control, or simply that host
control was overridden in our experiment. We conducted our experiments on
polyps and not mature hosts, and it is at the polyp stage in which infection initiates.
Thus, if hosts have mechanisms of partner choice (Bull and Rice 1991; Sachs et al.
2004) of symbionts we would expect these mechanisms to be active in the polyp
stage. The degree of host or symbiont control is poorly understood in this system.
Domination of control by either partner can alter the evolution of the symbiosis
(Frank 1996b), so this problem is critical to understanding the maintenance as well
as the potential breakdown of marine-algal symbioses.
Our results suggest that cheater algal symbionts exist in wild upside-down
jellyfish populations. With repeated horizontal transmission, we uncovered
symbionts that, relative to vertically transmitted algae, grew faster within their
hosts, attained higher densities within hosts and were expelled at higher rates (per-
host mass). This gain in within-host fitness came at a cost. Hosts infected with
horizontally transmitted algae grew significantly less. Because algal expulsion and
host size are positively correlated, the smaller size of these hosts resulted in
reduced overall symbiont transmission. Thus, the spread of cheaters in natural
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populations may be limited by their detriment to host fitness. We suggest that such
trade-offs can stabilize cooperation in many horizontally transmitted symbioses.
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Figure 1.  Partner fidelity feedback
Benefits transferred from X to Y feed back through an extended series of
exchanges. (Bx, By = Benefits to X, Y respectively; Cx, Cy = Costs to X, Y
respectively. Bx = f(By) means that benefits to X are a function of the benefits to Y.




f’ (By) > 0 X            Y
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Figure 2.  Partner Choice
Either individual X1 or X2 receives a benefit from Y, depending on Y’s choice. Y
chooses to interact with the more cooperative X individual. (Bx1, Bx2 = Benefits to
X1, X2 respectively, By1, By2 = Benefits to Y from X1, X2 respectively; Cy, is the
cost to Y.)
Bx2 if By2>By1







Figure 3.  Kin Selection
X evolves to benefits Y if rby - cx > 0. (r = coefficient of relatedness between X and
Y; cx = the cost of the act to X; by = the benefit of the act to Y.)
ByCx
X         Y
r(By)-Cx > 0 (Hamilton 1964a,b)
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Figure 4.  Basic byproduct benefits
Left: An act of X benefits Y as an automatic consequence (byproduct) X’s self
interested action (one sided). Right: Likewise, individual Y may, when performing
an act that benefits itself, also benefit X (two sided). (B'x, B'y  are benefits of self
interest to X, Y respectively. Bx, By  Are byproduct benefits to X, Y respectively.
Dashed lines refer to byproduct benefits).
X          Y
ByB’x




One Sided Two Sided
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Figure 5.  Byproduct reciprocity
Y evolves to enhance its benefit to X, which in turn increases the by-products it
receives from X. (B’x is a benefit of self-interest to X, By is a by-product benefit to
Y. Bx is a benefit to B. Dashed lines refer to byproduct benefits.)
B y = f(Bx)




Figure 6.  Passaging protocol
The iterated three step protocol: I) Encounter: coinfection of f1 and IKe in
Escherichia coli, II) Growth: enforcement of paired vertical transmission, III)
Reproduction: production of infectious bacteriophage progeny to complete the









Figure 7.  Cross-packaging and co-packaging assays
Phage supernatants from time points in the evolution were infected into each of the
cell lines at low multiplicities. A527 cells (N3 pili) could only be infected by
phages with IKe coats, K19 cells (F pili) could only be infected with phages with f1
coats, and K1037 cells (both pili), could be infected with either. Resultant colonies
growing on Kanamycin (KnR) contain an IKe genome, growing on
Chloramphenicol (CmR) contain an f1 genome, and colonies growing on both
(KnR/CmR) contain both genomes. Cross packaging rates were calculated as B/A+B
(f1 genome in IKe coat) and D/D+E (IKe genome in f1 coat). Rates of co-
packaging for each coat type were calculated as C/A+B+C (both genomes in IKe
coat), F/D+E+F (both genomes in f1 coat). Total co-packaging rates were
calculated in cells with both pili I/G+H+I (both genomes in either coat).
Pilus: KnR CmR KnR/CmR
N3 (Ike coats) A B C
F (f1 coats) D E F
Both (either coat) G H I
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Figure 8.  IKe genome minimization
IKe minimal phage visibly emerges in passage 41 and spreads to apparent fixation
by passage 43 (Extinction of IKe-full). Agarose electrophoresis of f1 and IKe DNA
genomic preparations of co-infected cells from passage numbers 38-45. Passages
are indicated above each lane, and two standards are on the right: IKe-min is a
DNA preparation of the minimal IKe phage from passage 50, whereas IKe-full is
the IKe used to initiate the experiment. The asterisk indicates the passage that the
minimal IKe genome is first detectable by electrophoresis.
IKe-full
IKe-min.






Figure 9.  IKe and f1 cross-packaging and co-packaging rates
Cross packaging rates evolved in opposite directions and co-packaging rates
increase 150 fold. Percentage and standard error of cross-packaging and co-
packaging rates are shown for f1 and IKe at passages 1, 20 and 40. At passage 50,














IKe with f1 coat
f1 with IKe coat
Co-packaged
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Figure 10.  Vertical transmission fitness component
Vertical transmission fitness increased significantly over the course of the
experiment. Mean and standard errors of relative fitness are shown for passages 38
and 50 relative to passage 1. Replicated competition experiments were conducted
with passage 1 versus 38, and passage 1 versus 50.


















Figure 11.  Infectious transmission fitness component
Infectious transmission fitness increased significantly for both phages over the
course of the experiment.  Mean and standard errors of phage produced per hour
are indicated for passages 1, 20, 40 and 50.  Ike-0, f1-0 lines indicate the individual
phage production rates of the two ancestral phages.















IKe f1 IKe-0 f1-0
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Figure 12.  Cassiopea-Symbiodinium symbiosis life cycle.
Algal symbionts are transmitted horizontally between generations. Female medusae
(sexual adults) release planula larvae (a) that disperse and settle as uninfected
polyps. Uninfected polyps bud to produce clonal offspring (b) ultimately becoming
infected by environmental algal symbionts (c). Infected polyps bud producing
clonal offspring that inherit algae via vertical transmission (d). Once infected,
polyps undergo metamorphosis (e). Both medusa and infected polyps release algae




























Figure 13.  Experimental design
Vertical treatment is above (V): buds released from polyps are saved in a separate
flask, where they settle into new polyps. After seven weeks of infection 30 polyps
are randomly selected from the newly settled pool. These settled polyps represent
the next generation. Horizontal treatment, in which buds are discarded, is below
(H). After 7 weeks, polyps are put into a new flask with ASW for 48 hours of algal
expulsion. Thirty isoclonal uninfected polyps are infected with the expelled algae.
The newly infected polyps represent the next generation. In both treatments there





expelled algae used to
infect uninfected polyps
(3 replicates)
buds used for next generation
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Figure 14.  Host and symbiont fitness measures
Hosts experienced higher fitness in the vertical treatment, while symbiont fitness
was higher in the horizontal treatment. Replicate means of horizontal (H) and
vertical (V) treatments are shown. Polyps re-infected with vertical treatment algae
grew at significantly higher rates (a), and budded at higher peak rates (b). The algae
from the horizontal treatment divided at significantly higher rates in their hosts (c),
and had significantly higher expulsion rates from their hosts - using host biomass as
a covariate (d). All treatment effects were significant: in nested ANOVA a, P <
0.001, N = 52; b, P < 0.05, N = 52; c, P = 0.003, N = 51; nested ANCOVA with
host biomass as a covariate d, P < 0.05, N = 52.

































































Figure 15.  Alternate host fitness
Horizontal treatment algae reduced host growth irrespective of host genotype.
Hosts were gathered from three disparate sites and infected with the experimentally
evolved algae of each treatment: Coco Plum (CCP), Grassy Key Quarry (GKQ),
and Matecumbe Key (MTK). *Significant treatment effect in full factorial


























TABLE 1.  Framework for the evolution of cooperation
General Models:                               Specific Models: Examples in text
Partner Fidelity Feedback:
X and Y are associated for an extended series of exchanges that last long
enough that a feedback operates: the effect of benefits transferred from X
to Y returns and enhances the fitness of X. Thus, by failing to cooperate,
individual X ultimately curtails its own fitness.
(Bull and Rice 1990, Nowak and May 1992, Frank 1994, Doebeli and









benefit Y, and Y
in turn
reciprocates that






Either individual X1 or X2 receives a benefit from Y, depending on Y’s
choice. Y chooses to interact with the X individual that offers greater
fitness returns.
(Darwin 1859, Eshel and Cavali-Sforza 1982, Noë 1990, Bull and Rice
1991, Peck 1992, Noë and Hammerstein 1994, Batali and Kitcher 1995,








X recognizes and directs benefits to more closely related X1 as opposed to
more distantly related X2 based on phenotype(s) of X1, X2.
(Hamilton 1964a, Queller 2000)
-Admission rules in
sweat bees, GP9 locus
in fire ants, M-factors
in beetles, csA genes
in social Amoebae.
Shared Genes
X benefits Y that
tends to carry the






X directs benefits to X1 base upon X1’s proximity to X. This proximity
denotes shared genes with X.





An act of X benefits Y as an automatic consequence (byproduct) of X’s
self interested action.




Both X and Y each benefit the other as automatic consequences
(byproducts) of their own selfish actions. Includes synergism: actions or
coordinated behavior that are automatically more fitness-enhancing when
performed in groups.
















Y evolves to enhance its benefit to X, which in turn increases the
byproducts it receives from X. The byproduct from X does not evolve, but





Table 2.  f1 point mutations. We identify loci by Genbank nucleotide number (nt), ‘Cm’ indicates a locus within the chloramphenicol gene
insert.  Gene numbers are indicated where appropriate and functions of genes/intergenic DNA are predicted as well as putative function of the
mutations in those regions. The passages in which mutations arose in and fixed were estimated via sequencing mutant stretches over multiple
passages. ‘Arose’ indicates the earliest passage for which there is evidence of a mutant allele and ‘fixed’ indicates the first passage in which no
peak was detected from the ancestral allele. Missense mutations are indicated with the gen-bank number of the mutant amino acid and the type of
transversion is indicated. Non-coding mutations that affected secondary structure are indicated where the change affected predicted stem and
loop structures.
nt                           gene                      Function                                            Putative evolution:                           Arose     Fixed        Amino-acid/ 20 
Cm186  na Non-coding insert DNA Unknown 2 10 Not applicable.
5674 IG (-) Strand Origin Anti-interference 11 20 Loop  Stem
957 V  ssDNA binding   cross-packaging 15 20 #39  Asn.  Asp.
5529 IG Morphogenetic signal   cross-packaging 30 35 Stem  Loop
2988 VI Minor coat protein adaptation to IKe-minimal 44 50 45 Ala.  Ser.
4072 I Assembly initiation cross/co-packaging 44 50 #293 Asp.  Tyr.
5521 IG Morphogenetic signal   cross-packaging 44 50 Stem  Loop
5529 IG Morphogenetic signal   cross-packaging 42 44 Loop  Stem
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Table 3. IKe point mutations and deletions: We identify loci by Genbank nucleotide number (nt). Deletion sizes are indicated. Gene numbers are
indicated where appropriate and functions of genes/intergenic DNA are predicted as well as putative importance of the mutations. The passages
in which mutations arose in and fixed were estimated via sequencing mutant stretches over multiple passages. ‘Arose’ indicates the earliest
passage for which there is evidence of a mutant allele and ‘fixed’ indicates the first passage in which no peak was detected from the ancestral
allele. Missense mutations are indicated with the Genbank number of the mutant amino acid and type of transversion is indicated. Non-coding
mutations that affected secondary structure are indicated where the change affected predicted stem and loop structures. The asterisks indicate
genes which never fixed.
nt                           gene                      Function                               Putative evolution:                                            Arose      Fixed         Amino-acid/ 20  
deletion 206nt Non-coding insert Fast reproduction 12 15 Not applicable
2173 III Minor coat protein Multiple particles 20 30 #31  Tyr.  Met.
6377 IG (-) Strand Origin Anti-interference, Packaging 30 38 Stem  Stem
6379 IG (-) Strand Origin Anti-interference, Packaging 30 38 Loop  Stem
6382 IG (-) Strand Origin Anti-interference, Packaging 30 38 Loop  Stem
6379 IG (-) Strand Origin Anti-interference, Packaging 40 42 Stem  Loop
6377 IG (-) Strand Origin Anti-interference, Packaging 40 42 Stem  Stem
deletion 4541nt All but II, X, and insert Fast reproduction, anti-binding 40 43 Not applicable
6681 IG Non-coding intergenic Unknown 40 42 Not applicable
1116 II,X DNA replication Copy number, anti-interference * * #70  Leu. Phe
1156 II,X DNA replication Copy number, anti-interference * * #84  Val. Ala.
88
REFERENCES
Adams R M M, Mueller U G, Green A M, Narozniak J M. 2000. Garden sharing
and garden stealing in fungus growing ants. Naturwissenschaften 87:491–493.
Alexander R D, Borgia G. 1978. Group selection, altruism, and the levels of
organization of life. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 9:449–474.
Alexander R D. 1987. The Biology of Moral Systems. NewYork: Aldine de
Gruyter.
Alonso W J, Schuck–Paim C. 2002. Sex–ratio conflicts, kin selection, and the
evolution of altruism. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA
99:6843–6847.
Alton N K, Vapnek D. 1979. Nucleotide sequence analysis of the chloramphenicol
resistance transposon Tn9. Nature 282:864–869.
Anderson R M, May R M. 1982. Coevolution of hosts and parasites. Parasitology
85:411–426.
Andersson S G E, Kurland C G. 1998. Reductive evolution of resident genomes.
Trends in Microbiology 6:263–268.
Arnold K E, Owens I P F. 1998. Cooperative breeding in birds: a comparative test
of the life history hypothesis. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B
265:739–745.
89
Axelrod R, Hamilton W D. 1981. The Evolution of cooperation. Science
211:1390–1396.
Babcock R C, Heyward A J. 1986. Larval development of certain
gamete–swapping scleractinian corals.  Coral Reefs 5:111–116.
Balderston W L, Claus G. 1969. A study of the symbiotic relationship between
Symbiodinium microadriaticum Freudenthal, a zooxanthella and the upside–down
Jellyfish, Cassiopeia sp. Nova Hedwigia 17:373–382.
Badgett M R, Auer A, Carmichael L E, Parrish C R, Bull J J. 2002. Evolutionary
dynamics of viral attenuation. Journal of Virology 76:10524–10529.
Baker A C, Rowan R. 1997. Diversity of symbiotic dinoflagellates (zooxanthellae)
in scleractinian coral of the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. Proceedings of the 8th
International Coral Reef Symposium 2:1301–1306.
Baker A C. 2001. Ecosystems—reef corals bleach to survive change. Nature
411:765–766.
Balderston W L, Claus G. 1969. A study of the symbiotic relationship between
Symbiodinium microadriaticum Freudenthal, a zooxanthella and the upside down
Jellyfish, Cassiopeia sp. Nova hedwigia 17:373–382.
Batali J, Kitcher P. 1995. Evolution of altruism in optional and compulsory games.
Journal of Theoretical Biology 175:161–171.
90
Beck E, Zink B. 1981. Nucleotide sequence and genome organization of
filamentous bacteriophages f1 and fd. Gene 16:35–58.
Beeman R W, Friesen K S, Denell R E. 1992. Maternal effect selfish genes in flour
beetles. Science 256:89–92.
Belda–Baille C A, Baille B K, Maruyama T. 2001. Specificity of a model
cnidarian–dinoflagellate symbiosis. Biological Bulletin 202:74–85.
Bell G. 1986. The evolution of empty flowers. Journal of Theoretical Biology
118:253–258.
Belt T. 1874. The Naturalist in Nicaragua. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bernasconi G, Strassmann J E. 1999. Cooperation among unrelated individuals: the
ant foundress case. Trends in Ecology  and Evolution 14:477–482.
Berry S S. 1912. The cephalopoda of the Hawaiian Islands. Bulletin of the Bureau
of Fisheries 32:255–362.
Bishop J D D, Sommerfeldt A D. 1999. Not like Botryllus: indiscriminate
post–metamorphic fusion in a compound ascidian. Proceedings of the Royal
Society of London B 266:241–248.
Boettcher K J, Ruby E G. 1990. Depressed light emission by symbiotic Vibrio
fischeri of the sepiolid squid Euprymna scolopes. Journal of Bacteriology
172:3701–3706.
91
Bradley D E. 1979. Morphology of pili determined by the N–incompatibility group
plasmid N3 and interaction with bacteriophage pr4 and bacteriophage IKe. Plasmid
2:632–636.
Bronstein J L. 2003. The scope for exploitation within mutualistic interactions.
Pages 185–202 in Genetic and cultural evolution of cooperation, edited by P
Hammerstein. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Brown C R, Bomberger Brown M, Shaffer M L. 1991.  Food–sharing signals
among socially foraging cliff swallows. Animal Behaviour 42:551–564.
Brown J L. 1983. Cooperation—a biologist’s dilemma. Advances in the Study of
Behavior 13:1–37.
Bshary R. 2001. The cleaner fish market. Pages 146–172 in Economics in Nature:
Social Dilemmas, Mate Choice and Biological Markets, edited by R Noë  et al.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bshary R. 2002. Biting cleaner fish use altruism to deceive image–scoring client
reef fish. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 269:2087–2093.
Bshary R, Grutter A S. 2002. Asymmetric cheating opportunities and partner
control in a cleaner fish mutualism. Animal Behaviour 63:547–555.
Buddemeier R W, Fautin D G. 1993. Coral bleaching as an adaptive mechanism.
Bioscience 43:320–326.
Bull J J, Rice W R. 1991. Distinguishing mechanisms for the evolution of
92
co–operation. Journal of Theoretical Biology 149:63–74.
Bull J J, Molineux I J, Rice W R. 1991. Selection for benevolence in a
host–parasite system. Evolution 45:875–882.
Bull J J, Molineux I J. 1992. Molecular–genetics of adaptation in an
experimental–model of cooperation. Evolution 46:882–895.
Bull J J, 1994. Perspective: virulence. Evolution 48:1423–1437.
Chittka L, Thompson J D, Waser N M. 1999. Flower constancy, insect psychology,
and plant evolution. Naturwissenschaften 86:361–377.
Clay K. 1988. Fungal endophytes of grasses: a defensive mutualism between plants
and fungi. Ecology 69(1):10–16.
Cockburn A. 1998. Evolution of helping behavior in cooperatively breeding birds.
Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 29:141–177.
Coffroth M A, Santos S R, Goulet T L. 2001. Early ontogenetic expression of
specificity in a cnidarian–algal symbiosis. Marine Ecology–Progress Series
222:85–96.
Connor R C. 1986. Pseudo–reciprocity: investing in mutualism. Animal Behaviour
34:1562–1584.
Connor R C. 1995a. The benefits of mutualism: a conceptual framework.
Biological Reviews 70:427–457.
93
Connor R C. 1995b. Altruism among non–relatives: alternatives to the ‘prisoner’s
dilemma. Trends in Ecology  and Evolution 10:84–86.
Cook C B, Logan A, Ward J, Lockhurst B, Berg Jr. C J. 1990. Elevated
temperatures and bleaching on a high–latitude coral reef: the 1988 Bermuda event.
Coral Reefs 9:45–49.
Crespi B J. 2001. The evolution of social behavior in microorganisms. Trends in
Ecology  and Evolution 16(4):178–183.
Darwin C. 1859. The Origin of Species. New York: Gramercy Books.
Dawkins R. 1976. The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford: University Press.
Dawkins R. 1989. The Selfish Gene. New Edition. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Dean W R J, Siegfried W R, MacDonald I A W. 1990. The fallacy, fact and fate of
guiding behavior in the greater honeyguide. Conservation Biology 4:99–101.
Denison R F. 2000. Legume sanctions and the evolution of symbiotic cooperation
by rhizobia. American Naturalist 156(6):567–576.
Doebeli M, Knowlton N. 1998. The evolution of interspecific mutualisms.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 95(15):8676–8680.
94
Douglas A E. 2003. Coral bleaching– how and why? Marine Pollution Bulletin
46:385–392.
Dowling D N, Broughton W J. 1986. Competition for nodulation of legumes.
Annual Review of Microbiology 40:131–157.
Dotto G P, Enea V, Zinder N D. 1981. Functional analysis of bacteriophage f1
intergenic region. Virology 114:463–473.
Dugatkin L A. 1997. Cooperation Among Animals: An Evolutionary Perspective.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Ebert D, Bull J J. 2003. Challenging the trade–off model for the evolution of
virulence: is virulence management feasible? Trends in Microbiology 11:15–20.
Eigen M. 1971. Self–organization of matter and the evolution of biological
macro–molecules. Naturwissenschaften 58:465–523.
Eigen M, Schuster P. 1977. The hypercycle. A principle of natural
self–organization. A: Emergence of the hypercycle. Naturwissenschaften
64:541–565.
Eshel I, Cavalli–Sforza L L. 1982. Assortment of encounters and evolution of
cooperativeness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA
79:1331–1335.
Ewald P W. 1983. Host–parasite relations, vectors, and the evolution of disease
severity. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 14:465–485.
95
Fadlallah T H. 1983. Sexual reproduction, development and larval biology in
scleractinian corals, a review. Coral Reefs 2:129–150.
Fine P E M. 1975. Vectors and vertical transmission: an epidemiological
perspective. Annals of the New York Academy of Science 266:173–194.
Fisher R A. 1930. The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Fitt W K. 2000. Cellular growth of host and symbiont in a cnidarian–zooxanthellar
symbiosis. Biological Bulletin 198:110–120.
Foster W A, Treherne J E. 1981. Evidence for the dilution effect in the selfish herd
from fish predation on a marine insect. Nature 293:466–467.
Frank S A. 1994. Genetics of mutualism—the evolution of altruism between
species. Journal of Theoretical Biology 170:393–400.
Frank S A. 1995. Mutual policing and repression of competition in the evolution of
cooperative groups. Nature 377:520–522.
Frank S A. 1996a. Host–symbiont conflict over mixing of symbiotic lineages.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, B. 263:339–344.
Frank S A. 1996b. Host control of symbiont transmission: the separation of
symbionts into germ and soma. American Naturalist 148:1113–1124.
96
Frank S A. 2003. Perspective: repression of competition and the evolution of
cooperation. Evolution 57:693–705.
Gamboa G J, Reeve H K, Ferguson D, Wacker T L.  1986. Nestmate recognition in
social wasps: the origin and acquisition of recognition odours. Animal Behaviour
34:685–695.
Gamboa G J, Berven K A, Schemidt R A, Fishwild T G, Jankens K M. 1991. Kin
recognition by larval wood frogs (Rana sylvatica): effects of diet and prior
exposure to conspecifics. Oecologia 86:319–324.
Gamboa G J, Grudzien T A, Espelie K E, Bura E A. 1996. Kin recognition
pheromones in social wasps:  combining chemical and behavioral evidence. Animal
Behavior 51:625–629.
Gilbert F S, Haines N, Dickson K. 1991. Empty flowers. Functional Ecology
5:29–39.
Goulet T L. 1999. Temporal and spatial stability of zooxanthellae in octocorals
[PhD dissertation]. Buffalo (NY): State University of New York at Buffalo. 101 p.
Green A M, Adams R M M, Mueller U G. 2002. Extensive exchange of fungal
cultivars between sympatric species of fungus growing ants. Molecular Ecology
11:191–195.
Greenberg L. 1979. Genetic component of bee odor in kin recognition. Science
206:1095–1097.
97
Grosberg R K, Quinn J F. 1986. The genetic control and consequences of kin
recognition by the larvae of a colonial marine invertebrate. Nature 322:456–459.
Grutter A S. 1999. Cleaner fish really do clean. Nature 398:672–673.
Hagen M J, Hamrick J L. 1996. A hierarchical analysis of population genetic
structure in Rhizobium leguminosarum bv. trifolii. Molecular Ecology 5:177–186.
Hamilton W D. 1964a. The genetical evolution of social behavior 1. Journal of
Theoretical Biology 7:1–16.
Hamilton W D. 1964b. The genetical evolution of social behavior 2. Journal of
Theoretical Biology 7:17–52.
Hamilton W D. 1967. Extraordinary sex ratios. Science 156:477–488.
Hamilton W D. 1971. Geometry of the selfish herd. Journal of Theoretical Biology
31:295–311.
Hansen P J, Nielsen T G. 1997. Mixotrophic feeding in Frafilidium subglobosum
(Dinophyceae) on three species of Ceratium: effects of prey concentration prey
species and light intensity. Marine Ecology Progress Series 147:187–196.
Hardin G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162:1243–1248.
Harrison P L, Wallace C C. 1990. Reproduction, dispersal and recruitment of
scleractinian corals. Pages 133–207 in Ecosystems of the World: Coral reefs, edited
by Z Dubinsky. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
98
Hensey S, McFall–Ngai M. 1992. A surface peptide of the bacterium Vibrio
fischeri plays a key role in specificity and recognition in the symbiosis with the
squid Euprymna scolopes. American Zoologist 32:37A.
Herre E A, West S A. 1997. Conflict of interest in a mutualism: documenting the
elusive fig wasp–seed trade–off. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B
264:1501–1507.
Hoesch W. 1937. Ueber das “Honiganzeigen” von Indicator. Journal für
Ornithologie 85:201–205.
Huth C J, Pellmyr O. 1999. Yucca moth oviposition and pollinator behavior is
affected by past flower visits: evidence for a host–marking pheromone. Oecologia
119:593–599.
Huth C J, Pellmyr O. 2000. Pollen–mediated selective abortion in yuccas and its
consequences for the plant–pollinator mutualism. Ecology 81(4):1100–1107.
Isack H A, Reyer H. 1989. Honeyguides and honey gatherers: interspecific
communication in a symbiotic relationship. Science 243:1343–1346.
Izzo T J, Vasconcelos H L. 2002. Cheating the cheater: domatia loss minimizes the
effects of ant castration in an Amazonian ant–plant. Oecologia 133:200–205.
Janzen D H. 1966. Coevolution of mutualism between ants and acacias in Central
America. Evolution 20:249–275.
99
Janzen D H. 1975. Pseudomyrmex nigripilosa: a parasite of a mutualism. Science
188:936–937.
Keller L, Ross K G. 1998. Selfish genes: a green beard in the red fire ant. Nature
394:573–575.
Kiers E T, Rousseau R A, West S A, Denison R F. 2003. Host sanctions and the
legume–rhizobium mutualism. Nature 425:78–81.
Kuykendall L D. 1989. Influence of glycine max nodulation on the persistence in
soil of genetically marked Bradyrhizobium japonicum strain. Plant Soil
116:275–277.
Lee K, Ruby E G. 1994a. Competition between Vibrio fischeri strains during
initiation and maintenance of the light organ symbiosis. Journal of Bacteriology
176:1985–1991.
Lee K, Ruby E G. 1994b. Effect of the squid host on the abundance and
distribution of symbiotic Vibrio fischeri in nature. Applied Environmental
Microbiology 60:1565–1571.
Lenski R E, May RM. 1994. The evolution of virulence in parasites and
pathogens— reconciliation between 2 competing hypotheses. Journal of
Theoretical Biology 169:253–265.
Lopez J, Webster R E. 1983. Morphogenesis of filamentous bacteriophage f1:
orientation of extrusion and production of polyphage. Virology 127:177–193.
100
Malcolm S B. 1986. Aposematism in a soft–bodied insect: a case for kin selection.
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 18:387–393.
Margulis, L. 1981. Symbiosis in cell evolution. W. H. Freeman, New York.
Marr D L, Brock M T, Pellmyr O. 2001. Coexistence of mutualists and antagonists:
exploring the impact of cheaters on the yucca–yucca moth mutualism. Oecologia
128:454–463.
Maynard Smith J. 1964. Group selection and kin selection. Nature 201:1145–1147.
Maynard–Smith J, Szathmary E. 1993. The origins of chromosomes I. selection for
linkage. Journal of Theoretical Biology 164: 437–446.
Maynard–Smith J, Szathmary E. 1995. The major transitions in evolution. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
McFall–Ngai M J. 1990. Crypsis in the pelagic environment. American Zoologist
30:175–188.
McFall–Ngai M J, Ruby E G. 1991. Symbiont recognition and subsequent
morphogenesis as early events in an animal–bacterial mutualism. Science 254:
1491–1494.
McFall–Ngai M J, Hensey S. 1992. Occurrence of myeloperoxidase–like enzyme
activity in symbiotic animal tissues. American Zoologist 32:40a.
Mélendez–Ackerman E, Campbell D R, Waser N M. 1997. Hummingbird behavior
101
and mechanisms of selection on flower color in Ipomopsis. Ecology
78(8):2532–2541.
Messenger S L, Molineux I J, Bull J J. 1999. Virulence evolution obeys a trade–off.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 266:397–404.
Messing J. 1979. A multipurpose cloning system based on the single–stranded
DNA bacteriophage M13. Recombinant DNA Technology Bulletin NIH Publication
#79–99,2:43–48.
Michel B, Zinder N D. 1989a. Translational repression in bacteriophage f1:
characterization of the gene V protein target on the gene II mRNA. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences 86:4002–4006.
Michel B, Zinder N D. 1989b. In vitro binding of the bacteriophage f1 gene V
protein to the gene II RNA–operator and its DNA analog. Nucleic Acids Research
17:7333–7344.
Michod R E. 1983. Population biology of the first replicators: the origin of
genotype, phenotype and organism. American Zoologist 23:5–14.
Michod R E. 1997. Cooperation and conflict in the evolution of individuality. I.
Multilevel selection of the organism. American Naturalist 149:607–645.
Michod R E. 2003. Cooperation and conflict mediation during the origin of
multicellularity in P. Hammerstein, ed. Genetic and cultural evolution of
cooperation. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
102
Model P, Russel M. 1988. Filamentous bacteriophage. Pages 375–456 in The
Bacteriophages edited by R Calendar. Plenum Press, New York.
Montgomery M K, Kremer P M. 1995. Transmission of symbiotic dinoflagellates
through the sexual cycle of the host scyphozoan Linuche unguiculata. Marine
Biology 124:147–155.
Montgomery M K, McFall–Ngai M J. 1994. Bacterial symbionts induce host organ
morphogenesis during early postembryonic development of the squid Euprymna
scolopes. Development 120:1719–1729.
Moran N A, Wernegreen J J. 2000. Lifestyle evolution in symbiotic bacteria:
insights from genomics. Trends in Ecology  and Evolution 15:321–326.
Mueller U G, Rehner S A, Schultz T R. 1998. The evolution of agriculture in ants.
Science 281:2034–2038.
Mueller U G. 2002. Ant versus fungus versus mutualism: ant cultivar conflict and
the deconstruction of the attine ant–fungus symbiosis. American Naturalist
160:S67–S98
Mueller U G, Poulin J, Adams R M M. 2004. Symiont choice in a fungus–growing
ant (Attini, Formicidae). Behavioral Ecology 15:357–364.
Muscatine L. 1990. The role of symbiotic algae in carbon and energy flux in reef
corals. Pages 75–81 in Ecosystems of the World: Coral Reefs, edited by Z
Dubinsky. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
103
Neff B D, Sherman P W. 2002. Decision making and recognition systems.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 269:1435–1441.
Noë  R. 1990. A veto game played by baboons: a challenge to the use of the
prisoner’s dilemma as a paradigm for reciprocity and cooperation. Animal
Behaviour 39:78–90.
Noë  R, Hammerstein P. 1994. Biological markets: supply and demand determine
the effect of partner choice on cooperation, mutualism and mating. Behavioural
Ecology and Sociobiology 35:1–11.
Noë  R, Hammerstein P. 1995. Biological markets. Trends in Ecology  and
Evolution 10(8):336–339.
Noë  R. 2001. Biological markets: partner choice as the driving force behind the
evolution of mutualisms. Pages 93–118 in Economics in Nature: Social Dilemmas,
Mate Choice and Biological Markets, edited by R Noë  et al. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Nowak M A, May R M. 1992. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature
359:826–829.
Nowak M A, Sigmund K. 1998. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring.
Nature 393:573–575.
Nuismer S L, Thompson J N, Gomulkiewicz R. 2000. Coevolutionary clines across
selection mosaics. Evolution 54(4):1102–1115.
104
Palmer J D. 1997. Organelle genomes: going, going, gone! Science 275:790–791.
Peck J R. 1993. Friendship and the evolution of cooperation. Journal of Theoretical
Biology 162:195–229.
Peeters B P H, Peters R M, Schoenmakers J G G, Konings R N H. 1985.
Nucleotide–sequence and genetic organization of the genome of the N–specific
filamentous bacteriophage IKe– comparison with the genome of F–specific
filamentous phage M13, phage fd and phage f1. Journal of Molecular Biology
181:27–39.
Peeters B P H, Schoenmakers J G G, Konings R N H. 1986. The gene II proteins of
the filamentous phages IKe and Ff (M13, fd and f1) are not functionally
interchangeable during viral strand replication. Nucleic Acids Research
14:5067–5080.
Peeters B P H, Schoenmakers J G G, Konings R N H. 1987. Comparison of the
DNA sequences involved in replication and packaging of the filamentous phages
IKe and Ff (M13, fd, and f1). DNA 6:139–147.
Pellmyr O, Thompson J N. 1992. Multiple occurrences of mutualism in the yucca
moth lineage. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA
89:2927–2929.
Pellmyr O, Huth C J. 1994. Evolutionary stability of mutualism between yuccas
and yucca moths. Nature 372:257–260.
105
Pellmyr O, Leebens–Mack J, Huth C J. 1996a. Nonmutualistic yucca moths and
their evolutionary consequences. Nature 380:155–156.
Pellmyr, O, Leebens–Mack J. 2000. Reversal of mutualism as a mechanism for
adaptive radiation in yucca moths. American Naturalist 156:S62–S76.
Perret X C, Staehelin C, Broughton W J. 2000. Molecular basis of symbiotic
promiscuity. Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews 64:180–201.
Pfennig D W, Gamboa G J, Reeve H K, Reeve J S, Ferguson I D. 1983. The
mechanism of nestmate discrimination in social wasps (Polistes, Hymenoptera:
Vespidae). Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 13: 299–305.
Pfennig D W. 1997. Kinship and cannibalism. Bioscience 47:667–675.
Pfennig D W. 2002. Kin recognition. Pages 592–595 in Encyclopedia of Evolution,
edited by M Pagel. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Queller D C. 1985. Kinship, reciprocity and synergism in the evolution of social
behavior. Nature 318:366–367.
Queller D C. 2000. Relatedness and the fraternal major transitions. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B 355:1647–1655.
Queller D C, Ponte E, Bozzaro S, Strassmann J E. 2003. Single–gene greenbeard
effects in the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum. Science 299:105–106.
Rainey P B, Rainey K. 2003. Evolution of cooperation and conflict in experimental
106
bacterial populations. Nature 425:72–74.
Ratnieks F L W, Visscher K. 1989. Worker policing in the honeybee. Nature
342:796–797.
Reeve H K. 1989. The evolution of conspecific acceptance thresholds. American
Naturalist 133:407–435.
Reyes V G, Schmidt E L. 1979. Population densities of Rhizobium japonicum strain
123 estimated directly in soil and rhizospheres. Applied and Environmental
Microbiology 37:854–858.
Richardson D H S. 1999. War in the world of lichens: parasitism and symbiosis as
exemplified by lichens and lichenicolous fungi. Mycological Research
103:641–650.
Richardson D S, Burke T, Komdeur J. 2002. Direct benefits and the evolution of
female–biased cooperative breeding in Seychelles warblers. Evolution
56:2313–2321.
Rinkevich B, Weissman I L. 1992. Allogenic resorption in colonial protochordates:
consequences of nonself recognition. Developmental and Comparative
Immunology 16:275–286.
Riolo R L, Cohen M D, Axelrod R. 2001. Evolution of cooperation without
reciprocity. Nature 414:441–443.
Rowan R, Knowlton N. 1995. Interspecific diversity and ecological zonation in
107
coral algal symbiosis. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA
92:2850–2853.
Ruby E G. 1996. Lessons from a cooperative, bacterial animal association: the
Vibrio–fischeri–Euprymna scolopes light organ symbiosis. Annual Review of
Microbiology 50:591–624.
Ruby E G, Lee K. 1998. The Vibrio fischeri–Euprymna scolopes light organ
association: current ecological paradigms. Applied and Environmental
Microbiology 64(3):805–812.
Russel M. 1992. Interchangeability of related proteins and autonomy of function.
The Morphogenetic proteins if filamentous phage f1 and IKe cannot replace one
another. Journal of Molecular Biology 227:453–462.
Russel M. 1993. Protein–protein interactions during filamentous phage assembly.
Journal of Molecular Biology 231:689–697.
Saikkonen K, Faeth S H, Helander M, Sullivan T J. 1998. Annual Review of
Ecology and Systematics 29: 319–343.
Sachs J L, Mueller U G, Wilcox T P,  Bull J J. 2004. The evolution of cooperation.
Quarterly Review of Biology 79:135–160.
Sachs J L, Wilcox T P. 2004. Cheating in the Cnidarian symbiont Symbiodinium
microadriaticum (in review).
108
Salstrom J S, Pratt D. 1971. Role of coliphage M13 gene V in single–stranded
DNA production. Journal of Molecular Biology 61:489–501.
Sanders W B, Lucking R. 2002. Reproductive strategies, relichenization and thallus
development observed in situ leaf dwelling lichen communities. New Phytologist
155:425–435.
Savage D C. 1977. Microbial ecology of the gastrointestinal tract. Annual Review
of Microbiology 31:107–133.
Schardl C L, Clay K. 1997. Evolution of mutualistic endophytes from plant
pathogens. Pages 221–238 in The Mycota V: Plant Relationships, edited by G C
Carroll and P Tudzynski. Berlin: Springer–Verlag.
Schemske D W, Bradshaw H D. 1999. Pollinator preference and the evolution of
floral traits in Monkeyflowers (Mimulus). Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences USA 96(21):11910–11915.
Schnable P S, Wise R P. 1998. The Molecular basis of cytoplasmic male sterility
and fertilization restoration. Trends in Plant Science Reviews 3(5):175–180.
Simms E L, Taylor D L. 2002. Partner choice in nitrogen–fixation mutualisms of
legumes and rhizobia. Integrative and Comparative Biology 42:369–380.
Singleton P W, Stockinger K R. 1983. Compensation against ineffective nodulation
in soybean. Crop Science 23:69–72.
Singley C T. 1983. Euprymna Scolopes. Pages 69–74 in Cephalopod Life Cycles,
109
Species Accounts, edited by P R Boyle. London: Academic Press.
Soberon J M, Martinez del Rio C. 1985. Cheating and taking advantage in
mutualistic associations. Pages 192–216 in The Biology of Mutualism edited by D
H Boucher. London: Croom Helm.
Smith F A, Smith S E. 1996. Mutualism and parasitism: Diversity in function and
structure in the “Arbuscular” (VA) mycorrhizal symbiosis. Advances in Botanical
Research.
Sprent J I, Sutherland J M, Faria S M. 1987. Some aspects of the biology of
nitrogen–fixing organisms. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of
London B, Biological Sciences 317:111–129.
Stanton M L, Palmer T M, Young T P, Evans A, Turner M L. 1999. Sterilization
and canopy modification of a swollen thorn acacia tree by a plant–ant. Nature
401:578–581.
Szathmary E. 1986. The eukaryotic cell as an information integrator.
Endocytobiological Cell Research 3:113–132.
Szathmary E, Demeter L. 1987. Group selection of early replicators and the origin
of life. Journal of Theoretical Biology 128:463–486.
Tamm C O. 1991. Nitrogen in Terrestrial Ecosystems. Berlin: Springer–Verlag.
Taylor L A, Rose R E. 1988. A correction in the nucleotide sequence of the Tn903
kanamycin resistance determinant in pUC4K. Nucleic Acids Research 16:358.
110
Taylor P D, Wilson D S. 1988. A mathematical model of altruism in haystacks.
Evolution 42:193–196.
Trench R K. 1993. Microalgal–invertebrate symbioses: a review. Endocytobiosis
and Cell Research 9:135–175.
Trivers R L. 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of
Biology 46:35–57.
Trivers R. 1985. Social Evolution. Menlo Park (CA): Benjamin/Cummings
Publishing.
Turner P E, Chao L. 1999. Prisoner’s dilemma in an RNA virus. Nature
398:441–443.
Uvardi M K, Kahn M L. 1993. Evolution of the (Brady) Rhizobium–legume
symbiosis: why do bacteroids fix nitrogen? Symbiosis 14:87–101.
Velicer G J, Yu Y N. 2003. Evolution of novel swarming in the bacterium,
Myxococcus xanthus. Nature 425:75–78.
Visick K G, Foster J, Doino J, McFall–Ngai M, Ruby E G. 2000. Vibrio fischeri
lux genes play an important role in colonization and development of the host light
organ. Journal of Bacteriology 182(16):4578–4586.
Wallace D C. 1999. Mitochondrial diseases of man and mouse. Science
283:1482–1488.
111
Waser N M, Price M V. 1981. Pollinator choice and stabilizing selection for flower
color in Delphonium nelsonii. Evolution 35(2):376–390.
Wei S L, Young R E. 1989. Development of symbiotic bacterial luminescence in a
nearshore cephalopod, Euprymna scolopes. Marine Biology 103:541–546.
West S A, Herre E A. 1994. The ecology of the New World fig–parasitizing wasps
Idarnes and implications for the evolution of the fig–pollinator mutualism.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 258:67–72.
West S A, Murray M G, Machado C A, Griffin A S, Herre E A. 2001. Testing
Hamilton’s rule with competition between relatives. Nature 409:510–513.
West S A, Pen I, Griffin A S. 2002a. Cooperation and competition between
relatives. Science 296:72–75.
West S A, Kiers E T, Simms E L, Denison R F. 2002b. Sanctions and mutualism
stability: why do rhizobia fix nitrogen? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London
B 269:685–694.
West–Eberhard M J. 1975. Evolution of social behavior by kin selection. Quarterly
Review of Biology 50(1):1–33.
Wilkerson F P, Muller–Parker G, Muscatine L. 1983. Temporal patterns of cell
division in natural populations of endosymbiotic algae. Limnology and
Oceanography 28: 1009–1014.
112
Wilkinson D M, Sherratt T N. 2001. Horizontally acquired mutualisms, an
unsolved problem in ecology? Oikos 92(2):377–384.
Williams G C. 1966. Adaptation and Natural Selection. Princeton (NJ): Princeton
University Press.
Wilson D S. 1975. A general theory of group selection. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences USA 72:143–146.
Wilson D S, Dugatkin L A. 1997. Group selection and assortative interactions.
American Naturalist 149(2): 336–351.
113
VITA
Joel Lawrence Sachs was born in Chicago, Illinois on October 6, 1971, the
son of Barbara C. Sachs and Martin G. Sachs.  He was awarded a High School
diploma in 1989 from Niles North High School in Skokie, Illinois.  He then
attended the University of Iowa where he was awarded a Bachelor of Arts in
Biology in 1993.  After receiving his Bachelor of Arts, he worked for the
University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, as a research assistant in a neuroscience
laboratory.  He then attended the University of North Dakota, in Grand Forks.
There he studied social evolution in birds and was awarded a Master’s in Science in
1995.  His thesis title was ‘The Evolutionary Origin of Coloniality: A Test of
Hypotheses with the Red-necked Grebe.’  After graduation, in 1998, he worked as
a senior research associate at the Oregon Health Sciences University, Neurological
Sciences Institute, in Portland, Oregon.  In 1999, he entered the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin.
Permanent Address:  9513 Lowell Avenue, Skokie, Illinois 60076.
This dissertation was typed by the author.
